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Ludwig Wittgenstein

1889 CE – 1951 CE · Vienna, Austria; Cambridge, England · European

Austrian-born philosopher who produced two distinct and hugely influential philosophies of language, in the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations.

Life

Wittgenstein was born into one of the wealthiest families in Vienna and trained as an engineer before going to Cambridge in 1911 to study logic with Bertrand Russell. He wrote the Tractatus while serving in the Austrian army in the First World War. Believing he had solved the problems of philosophy, he gave away his fortune and worked as a village schoolteacher and a gardener.

He returned to Cambridge in 1929 and gradually came to reject much of his earlier view. He became professor in 1939, worked as a hospital porter during the Second World War, and resigned in 1947. The Philosophical Investigations appeared two years after his death.

Core ideas

In more depth

Two philosophies. Wittgenstein produced two bodies of work, the second largely a criticism of the first. What unites them is the view that philosophical problems arise from misunderstanding the logic of our language, and that the task is to make them disappear, not to answer them with theories.

The Tractatus. The world is the totality of facts. A proposition is a picture of a possible state of affairs: its elements stand for objects, and their arrangement shows how the objects are said to be arranged. All meaningful propositions are truth-functions of elementary ones. The truths of logic are tautologies and say nothing. What a picture has in common with reality, its logical form, cannot itself be said; it shows itself.

Saying and showing. It follows that ethics, aesthetics, the meaning of life and the propositions of philosophy itself cannot be stated. The book calls its own sentences nonsensical, a ladder to be thrown away after climbing. Its last sentence is: whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Whether the nonsense is supposed to convey deep truths or is plain nonsense divides interpreters.

The Investigations. The later work rejects the idea that language has one essence. It opens by criticising a picture in which words name objects and sentences combine names. Look at how words are actually used: giving orders, describing, thanking, joking. For a large class of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language. These activities are language-games, woven into forms of life. The things called games share no single feature, only overlapping similarities, family resemblances.

Rules and privacy. What makes it the case that I am following one rule and not another, given that any action can be made to fit some interpretation? Following a rule is a practice, a custom. It follows that there could not be a language whose words refer to what only the speaker can know, since nothing would distinguish using a word correctly from seeming to. An inner process stands in need of outward criteria.

Philosophy as therapy. Philosophy leaves everything as it is. It assembles reminders of how words are used, to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. On Certainty, his last notes, argues that some propositions stand fast as the hinges on which doubt and inquiry turn.

The life. Wittgenstein was the youngest son of one of the richest industrialists in Austria. He studied engineering in Manchester, went to Russell at Cambridge in 1911, and wrote the Tractatus as a soldier in the First World War, finishing it in a prisoner-of-war camp. Believing the problems solved, he gave away his fortune and worked as a village schoolteacher, a gardener and an architect. He returned to Cambridge in 1929 and published nothing further; the Investigations appeared two years after his death in 1951.

The picture theory. The Tractatus is said to have begun from a report of a Paris court in which a traffic accident was represented with model cars and dolls. A proposition is like that: its elements stand for objects, and the way they are arranged says that the objects are so arranged. To understand a proposition is to know what is the case if it is true. Whatever a picture has in common with reality in order to depict it, its form, it cannot itself depict.

The builders and the beetle. The Investigations opens with a language of four words, “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”, used by a builder calling to an assistant. It works, and there is no naming ceremony behind it. Later he imagines that each person has a box with something in it called a beetle, and no one can look in another's box. The thing in the box plays no part in the use of the word; the box might even be empty. So with sensation, if we model it on object and name.

Following a rule. A pupil taught to add two continues correctly to 1000 and then writes 1004, 1008. He says he went on in the same way. Any series of steps can be made to fit some rule on some interpretation. What then fixes the right step? Not a further interpretation. There is a way of grasping a rule which is shown in what we call obeying it in actual cases. Rule-following is a practice, a custom, and at the bottom of the game lies acting.

Seeing as and certainty. He discusses a drawing that can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit: nothing on the page changes, yet we see it differently. Late notes, On Certainty, respond to Moore: “here is a hand” is not something I know by evidence. It belongs to the frame within which doubting and knowing take place, like the hinges on which a door turns.

In their words

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposition 7 (Ogden translation)

Works

Where scholars disagree

How deep the break is between the early and the later work is disputed; “resolute” readers argue that the Tractatus already aims only to cure the reader of nonsense.

A common misreading

The Vienna Circle read the Tractatus as an attack on everything that cannot be scientifically stated. Wittgenstein held that what cannot be said, such as the ethical, is what matters most.

Influenced by

Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, G.E. Moore, William James

Influenced

Rudolf Carnap, Gilbert Ryle, G.E.M. Anscombe, Saul Kripke, Thomas Kuhn

Related ideas

Language-games, Private language argument

Schools and eras

Analytic

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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