Saul Kripke
American logician whose work on modal logic, reference and necessity transformed analytic metaphysics and philosophy of language.
Life
Kripke grew up in Omaha, Nebraska, the son of a rabbi. As a teenager he published a completeness proof for modal logic that established the now-standard “possible worlds” semantics. He studied mathematics at Harvard and never took a doctorate.
He taught at Rockefeller University, at Princeton for many years, and finally at the City University of New York. His most famous work, Naming and Necessity, consists of three lectures given without notes at Princeton in 1970.
Core ideas
- Proper names are rigid designators: they pick out the same individual in every possible world in which it exists.
- Names refer through a causal-historical chain of use, not through descriptions in speakers' minds.
- There are necessary truths known only by experience, such as that water is H₂O.
- There are contingent truths knowable a priori.
- A sceptical reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein on rule-following, according to which nothing about a speaker fixes what rule is being followed.
In more depth
Modal logic. As a teenager Kripke supplied a semantics for the logic of necessity and possibility. A statement is necessary if true in all possible worlds accessible from a given one, and different systems of modal logic correspond to different conditions on the accessibility relation. This gave modal notions the clarity that had been lacking.
Names. The received view, from Frege and Russell, was that a name has its reference fixed by a description the speaker associates with it. Kripke argues this is wrong. Aristotle might not have taught Alexander, but he could not have failed to be Aristotle. A name is a rigid designator: it refers to the same individual in every possible world where that individual exists. Most descriptions are not. And speakers can refer by a name while knowing almost nothing true of its bearer.
The causal picture. In place of descriptions he sketches how reference is fixed: an object is given a name at an initial baptism, and the name is passed from speaker to speaker, each intending to use it as those before did.
Necessary a posteriori. Kant assumed that what is necessary is knowable a priori. Kripke separates the two. Necessity is a metaphysical notion; a priority is about how something can be known. If Hesperus is Phosphorus, then necessarily so, since both names rigidly designate one planet, yet it took observation to discover. The same goes for water is H2O. This revived talk of essences.
Against identity theory. If pain were identical with a brain state, the identity would be necessary. But it seems possible to have one without the other, and unlike the case of heat, the appearance cannot be explained away, since pain is its own appearance.
Rules. His reading of Wittgenstein poses a sceptical paradox: no fact about my past determines that by plus I meant addition and not some other function. The sceptical solution appeals to the community's practice. Few accept this as what Wittgenstein meant, but the problem has had a life of its own.
The prodigy. Kripke, the son of a rabbi in Omaha, published a completeness proof for modal logic at eighteen, using the idea that a statement is necessary when it is true in every possible world accessible from a given one. Naming and Necessity is the transcript of three lectures given at Princeton in 1970 without notes. He published comparatively little, and much of his work circulated for decades as recordings and typescripts.
The Gödel case. Suppose most people associate with the name “Gödel” only the description “the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic”. Now imagine that the proof was really the work of a man named Schmidt, whose manuscript Gödel stole. On the description theory, ordinary speakers using “Gödel” would be referring to Schmidt. They plainly are not. So the description does not fix what the name refers to; a chain of communication back to the man does.
Three distinctions kept apart. Kripke insists on separating the necessary, a matter of how things could have been, from the a priori, a matter of how something is known, and from the analytic, a matter of meaning. He gives examples that cross them. The standard metre rod is one metre long: known without measurement, yet it might have been longer. Water is H2O: discovered by experiment, yet nothing that is not H2O could be water.
Origin and essence. Could this very table have been made from a different block of wood, or from ice? Kripke says no: anything made from different material would be a different table. Could the Queen have been born of different parents? No. An object's origin and a substance's composition are essential to it. These claims revived essentialism, which Quine had treated as incoherent.
Pain and the puzzle about belief. Against the identity of pain with a brain state, he argues that both terms are rigid, so an identity would be necessary; yet it seems the brain state could occur without pain, and this appearance cannot be explained away as it can for heat. In another paper, Pierre believes that “Londres est jolie” and, living in an ugly district, that London is not pretty: does he believe that London is pretty or not?
Works
- A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic, 1959
- Naming and Necessity, lectures 1970; published 1972, as a book 1980
- Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 1982
A common misreading
Kripke's possible worlds are not distant places waiting to be discovered. He described them as stipulated ways the world might have been, in contrast to the realism of David Lewis.
Influenced by
Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Stuart Mill, W.V.O. Quine
Influenced
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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