Thomas Kuhn
American historian and philosopher of science who described scientific change as a series of revolutions between incompatible paradigms.
Life
Kuhn took a doctorate in physics at Harvard and turned to the history of science after being asked to teach it to undergraduates. Trying to understand why Aristotle's physics had once seemed reasonable changed his view of how science develops.
He taught at Berkeley, Princeton and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962, became one of the most cited academic books of the century.
Core ideas
- Normal science is puzzle-solving within a paradigm, a shared framework of theory, methods and exemplary achievements.
- Accumulating anomalies bring crisis, and a revolution replaces the old paradigm with a new one (see Paradigm shift).
- Rival paradigms are incommensurable: they have no fully shared standards or vocabulary by which to compare them.
- What scientists observe is shaped by the theories they hold.
- Scientific progress is not a steady approach to a fixed truth.
In more depth
Normal science. Most scientific work, Kuhn argues, is not the testing of fundamental theories. It is puzzle-solving within an accepted framework that defines which problems matter and what counts as a solution. He calls the framework a paradigm. Students learn it less from stated rules than from exemplars, the standard solved problems of the textbooks. Normal science is conservative, and that is what makes it productive.
Anomaly and crisis. Puzzles that resist solution are at first set aside. When anomalies accumulate in central areas, confidence fails and the field enters a crisis in which fundamentals are debated and rival approaches appear.
Revolution. A crisis ends when a new paradigm wins the allegiance of the community. The change is not forced by logic and experiment alone. He compares it to a gestalt switch and to a conversion. After a revolution scientists work in a different world: they see different things when looking at the same objects.
Incommensurability. Rival paradigms lack a common measure. Their standards for a good solution differ; key terms such as mass change meaning; and their adherents may disagree about what the data are. So there is no neutral procedure that compels a choice. This is the most contested claim in the book.
Progress. Science progresses in the sense that later paradigms solve more puzzles. But Kuhn denies that this is progress toward the truth about what is really there. He compares it to evolution, which is from something and not toward anything.
Criticism and reply. Critics accused him of making theory choice irrational. Masterman found the word paradigm used in many senses. In later writing he distinguished the disciplinary matrix from exemplars, and argued that shared values such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness guide choice without fixing it, since scientists may weigh them differently. He rejected the relativist use made of his work.
The Aristotle experience. Kuhn was a physics graduate student at Harvard when, in 1947, he was asked to prepare lectures on the history of mechanics. Reading Aristotle's Physics, he found it full of what looked like absurd errors about motion. Then, he recalled, the pieces suddenly sorted themselves: Aristotle meant by motion change in general, and was answering different questions. The lesson was that past science has to be read in its own terms, and that it was coherent in those terms.
What a paradigm does. A paradigm is first of all an exemplar: a concrete achievement, such as Newton's treatment of planetary orbits, that students learn by working problems. From it they acquire a way of seeing new problems as like old ones, without explicit rules. A paradigm also tells the community which problems are worth solving and guarantees that they have solutions. Normal science is therefore highly cumulative, and failure to solve a puzzle reflects on the scientist and not on the theory.
The duck and the rabbit. Kuhn uses the gestalt figure that can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit to describe what happens in a revolution. After Copernicus, astronomers looking at the moon saw a satellite where they had seen a planet. After Lavoisier, chemists saw oxygen where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated air. Kuhn says that in a sense the scientist afterward works in a different world, a phrase he spent years qualifying.
Five values. In later essays Kuhn listed the criteria all scientists share in choosing between theories: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. They function as values and not as rules, because they can conflict and can be weighed differently by different people. Theory choice is therefore rational without being dictated by an algorithm, and disagreement among competent scientists is to be expected.
The reception. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions sold over a million copies and gave the phrase “paradigm shift” to the general language. Sociologists of science took it as licence for studying scientific belief as a social product. Kuhn, who considered himself a defender of science's authority, was uneasy with many who claimed to follow him.
Works
- The Copernican Revolution, 1957
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962; second edition 1970
- The Essential Tension, 1977
A common misreading
Kuhn denied that he had made science irrational or a matter of “mob psychology”. In the 1970 Postscript and a 1977 essay on theory choice he argued that shared values such as accuracy, scope and simplicity guide theory choice without dictating it.
Influenced by
Ludwig Wittgenstein, W.V.O. Quine, Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap
Related ideas
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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