Gilbert Ryle
Oxford philosopher who attacked Cartesian dualism as a “category mistake” and analysed mental concepts in terms of behaviour and dispositions.
Life
Ryle spent his whole career at Oxford, apart from intelligence work in the Second World War. He was professor of metaphysical philosophy from 1945 and edited Mind from 1947 to 1971, in which roles he did much to make Oxford the centre of post-war philosophy.
He began with a serious interest in Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, whose Being and Time he reviewed in 1929, before turning to the analysis of ordinary concepts.
Core ideas
- The “official doctrine” of a mind lodged inside a body is “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine”.
- It rests on a category mistake, like a visitor who is shown the colleges and libraries and then asks to see the university.
- To describe someone's mind is largely to describe how they are disposed to behave.
- Knowing how to do something is not reducible to knowing that something is the case.
- Philosophy maps the “logical geography” of concepts.
In more depth
The official doctrine. Ryle sets out what he calls Descartes' myth. Every person has a body, which is in space and publicly observable, and a mind, which is not in space and is known only to its owner. A person lives two parallel histories. He labels this, with deliberate abusiveness, the dogma of the ghost in the machine.
Category mistakes. The doctrine is not a set of false statements but one big mistake of a special kind. A visitor shown the colleges, libraries and offices asks where the university is, as if it were another building. He has put the university in the wrong logical category. To treat the mind as a second thing alongside the body, with its own non-mechanical causes, is the same error.
Dispositions. Most statements about the mind do not report hidden episodes. They say what a person can do, tends to do or would do in certain circumstances. To call someone intelligent or vain is like calling glass brittle. The statement is true in virtue of how they would behave, not of something happening in a private theatre.
Knowing how. Intelligent performance is not the outward effect of a prior act of consulting a rule. If it were, that act would itself need to be done intelligently, and a regress follows. Knowing how to do something is distinct from knowing that something is so, and is prior to it.
Self-knowledge. We find out about our own minds much as we find out about others', by attending to what we do and say, though we have more data in our own case.
Objections. Critics call the view behaviourism and object that it cannot account for sensations, imagery and silent thought, which seem to be episodes. Ryle denied the label and later wrote at length on thinking. The book shaped the philosophy of mind that followed.
The university visitor. A visitor to Oxford is shown the colleges, the libraries, the laboratories and the offices, and then asks: but where is the university? His mistake is to suppose that the university is another member of the class to which those things belong, when it is the way they are organised. To ask where the mind is, in addition to a person's doings and sayings, is, Ryle argues, the same kind of mistake. He called the Cartesian picture the dogma of the ghost in the machine.
The regress of intelligent action. The intellectualist holds that an act is intelligent because it is guided by a prior act of considering a rule. But considering a rule is itself something that can be done well or badly. If it needed a further act of considering, nothing intelligent could ever begin. So intelligent performance is not a double operation of theory and then practice. Knowing how to do something is a capacity, shown in the doing.
Thick description. In late essays on thinking, Ryle asks what distinguishes a boy who winks from one whose eyelid twitches, and from one who parodies a wink. The movements may be identical. The difference is not a hidden inner act accompanying the movement; it is given by a fuller description of what he is doing, with its purposes and conventions. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz took the term “thick description” from these essays.
Dilemmas and the editor. Ryle's Dilemmas treats conflicts such as that between the world of science and the everyday world as boundary disputes between different kinds of account, to be settled by mapping the logic of each. As editor of Mind for twenty-five years and as the organiser of graduate philosophy at Oxford, he shaped the profession in Britain. He later allowed that The Concept of Mind leaned too far toward behaviourism.
Works
- Systematically Misleading Expressions, 1932
- The Concept of Mind, 1949
- Dilemmas, 1954
A common misreading
Ryle is usually labelled a behaviourist. He rejected the label, and he did not deny that people have inner lives, only that these form a second, hidden world.
Influenced by
Ludwig Wittgenstein, G.E. Moore, Edmund Husserl, Aristotle
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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