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G.E. Moore

1873 CE – 1958 CE · London and Cambridge, England · European

Cambridge philosopher who defended common sense against scepticism and idealism and argued that “good” cannot be defined.

Also known as: George Edward Moore

Life

Moore studied classics and then philosophy at Cambridge, where he and Bertrand Russell together rejected the idealism of their teachers. He taught at Cambridge for most of his life and edited the journal Mind for more than twenty-five years.

He published relatively little, but his patient, literal-minded way of asking exactly what a philosophical claim means shaped the style of analytic philosophy. His Principia Ethica was also taken up as a guide to life by the Bloomsbury Group.

Core ideas

In more depth

Against idealism. In The Refutation of Idealism Moore attacks the doctrine that to be is to be perceived. Idealists, he argues, fail to distinguish the act of awareness from its object. The sensation of blue and the sensation of green share consciousness and differ in object, so blue is not the same as the awareness of it. Nothing follows about whether it could exist unperceived.

Good is indefinable. Principia Ethica asks what good means and answers that it cannot be defined. Good is a simple, non-natural property, as yellow is a simple natural one. Any proposed definition, for instance that good means pleasant, can be tested by asking: this is pleasant, but is it good? The question is always significant, so the terms cannot mean the same. To identify good with any natural property is the naturalistic fallacy.

Intuition and ideals. What things are good in themselves is known by intuition and cannot be proved. He judged that the greatest goods are the pleasures of human affection and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. Right action is that which produces the most good. The open question argument shaped ethics for half a century, though many now think it shows only that the concepts differ, not the properties.

Common sense. In A Defence of Common Sense he lists truisms he knows with certainty: that there is a living human body which is his, that the earth has existed for many years, that there are other people. Philosophers who deny such things contradict what they themselves believe. What is uncertain is the correct analysis of these propositions.

Proof of an external world. Here is one hand, and here is another; therefore external objects exist. Moore holds that he knows the premises better than he could know the premises of any sceptical argument. Wittgenstein's On Certainty is a long reflection on what is right and wrong in this.

The paradox. He noticed the absurdity of asserting it is raining but I do not believe it, though what is asserted might be true.

The manner. Moore's influence owed much to how he did philosophy. He would ask of a philosophical statement: what exactly does this mean, and is it true? He is described as reacting to claims such as “time is unreal” with open astonishment. If time is unreal, did I not have breakfast before lunch? The method treats the plain meaning of a claim as the first test and puts the burden on the philosopher who denies what everyone knows.

The open question. Take any proposed definition of good, such as “what we desire to desire”. We can always ask, of something that fits the definition, whether it is good, and the question makes sense. If good simply meant that property, the question would be as empty as asking whether a bachelor is unmarried. Moore concludes that good names a simple, non-natural quality. Critics reply that a definition can be correct without being obvious, as water is H2O.

Organic unities. The value of a whole, Moore holds, need not equal the sum of the values of its parts. Consciousness of a beautiful object has great value; the object alone has little, and consciousness alone little. This principle blocks simple calculation. His last chapter concludes that by far the most valuable things we know are the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects, a claim the Bloomsbury circle of Keynes, Strachey and Woolf took as a creed.

What we ought to do. Moore held that right action is whatever produces the most good. Since we cannot know the remote results of our acts, he drew a conservative conclusion: we should generally follow the established rules of our society, which have proved useful. His disciples took the chapter on ideals and ignored the chapter on conduct, as Keynes later recalled.

Analysis. Moore distinguished knowing that a common-sense statement is true from knowing its correct analysis. He was certain that he had hands and quite uncertain what the analysis of “this is a hand” is, whether in terms of sense-data or otherwise. The distinction shaped a generation of analytic philosophy.

Works

A common misreading

The “naturalistic fallacy” is often equated with Hume's Is–ought problem. Moore's point is about defining “good”, and it applies equally to supernatural definitions; it is not about deriving “ought” from “is”.

Influenced by

David Hume, Immanuel Kant

Influenced

Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle

Schools and eras

Analytic

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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