Gottlob Frege
German mathematician who invented modern quantificational logic and founded the philosophy of language.
Life
Frege spent his entire career teaching mathematics at the University of Jena, where his work was largely ignored. In 1879 he published a short book setting out a new formal logic, far more powerful than Aristotle's. He then set about showing that arithmetic can be derived from logic alone.
In 1902, as the second volume of his major work was in press, Bertrand Russell wrote to him pointing out a contradiction in its foundations. Frege acknowledged that the system was shaken, and he eventually gave up the project. His importance was recognised mainly through Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap; of the three, only Carnap attended his lectures.
Core ideas
- A logic of quantifiers and variables, able to express statements involving “all” and “some” in any combination.
- Logicism: the truths of arithmetic are truths of logic.
- The distinction between the sense and the reference of an expression.
- The context principle: ask for the meaning of a word only in the context of a sentence.
- Logic is objective and independent of psychology.
In more depth
Logic remade. Aristotle's logic could not represent the reasoning of mathematics. In the Begriffsschrift Frege replaced the analysis of sentences into subject and predicate with the analysis into function and argument, and introduced quantifiers and variables to handle generality. Statements such as every number has a successor, which involve more than one quantifier, could now be treated exactly. This is the foundation of modern logic.
Logicism. Frege set out to show that arithmetic is a part of logic: that its concepts can be defined in logical terms and its truths derived from logical laws. If so, arithmetic is analytic, against Kant. In the Foundations he argues that a statement of number is an assertion about a concept. To say there are four horses is to say something about the concept horse that draws the carriage. Numbers are objects, defined as extensions of concepts.
Against psychologism. Logic studies the laws of truth, not how people happen to think. He lays down three principles: separate the logical from the psychological; ask for the meaning of a word only in the context of a sentence; and keep in view the distinction between concept and object.
Sense and reference. The morning star is the evening star is informative, while the morning star is the morning star is not, though both names stand for Venus. Frege explains this by distinguishing an expression's reference, the thing it stands for, from its sense, the way that thing is presented. Sentences have a sense, the thought they express, and a reference, which is a truth value.
The paradox. In 1902 Russell wrote to him that the system allowed the formation of the class of all classes that are not members of themselves, which is a member of itself if and only if it is not. Frege replied that arithmetic totters. He never found a repair he accepted. His logic and his philosophy of language survived, and he is commonly regarded as a founder of analytic philosophy.
The context principle and number. The Foundations of Arithmetic lays down three rules: separate the psychological from the logical; ask for the meaning of a word only in the context of a sentence; keep in mind the distinction between concept and object. A statement of number, Frege argues, says something about a concept: to say that Venus has zero moons is to say that nothing falls under the concept “moon of Venus”. Numbers are then defined as objects, by way of the relation of one-to-one correspondence between concepts.
Concept and object. For Frege a concept is a function that yields a truth value for each object. Concepts are incomplete; objects are complete. A sentence is unified because an incomplete part is filled by a complete one. This leads to an awkwardness he admitted: the phrase “the concept horse” is a complete expression and so names an object, not a concept. He asked the reader to meet him halfway with a grain of salt.
Thoughts. In a late essay Frege argues that a thought, the sense of a sentence, is neither a thing in the outer world nor an idea in someone's mind. Ideas need a bearer and cannot be shared; the Pythagorean theorem is the same for everyone and was true before anyone thought it. Thoughts belong to a third realm. We grasp them, but do not make them. The view is a firm form of realism about the content of mathematics and logic.
The letter and after. Russell's letter of June 1902 reached Frege as the second volume of his Basic Laws was in press. He added an appendix beginning: hardly anything more unwelcome can befall a scientific writer than to have a foundation give way after the work is finished. His attempted repair failed, and he eventually gave up logicism. He was little recognised in his lifetime. Diaries from his last year show nationalist and antisemitic views that his admirers have had to acknowledge.
Works
- Begriffsschrift (Concept-Script), 1879
- The Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884
- On Sense and Reference, 1892
- Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 1893, 1903
A common misreading
Frege was not a recognised founder in his own time. He died in obscurity, and his standing as the father of analytic philosophy is largely a judgement of the later twentieth century.
Influenced by
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant
Influenced
Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Edmund Husserl, Saul Kripke
Related ideas
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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