Private language argument
Wittgenstein's argument that a language whose words refer to what only the speaker can know is impossible.
Explanation
Suppose I try to name one of my sensations by concentrating on it and writing “S” in a diary whenever it recurs. Ludwig Wittgenstein asks what makes my later uses of “S” correct. I have only my impression that this is the same sensation again, and no independent check. Whatever seems right to me will be right, and that means we cannot talk about “right” here at all.
The conclusion is not that sensations are unreal. It is that words for them get their meaning from a public practice with shared criteria, such as the natural expression of pain. The argument, in §§243–315 of the Philosophical Investigations, is aimed at the Cartesian picture of the mind as a private inner realm.
Critics
A.J. Ayer and others replied that memory must be trusted at some point even in public checking. Saul Kripke reinterpreted the argument as a consequence of a wider scepticism about following rules, a reading many Wittgenstein scholars reject.
Where scholars disagree
There is no agreement about exactly what the argument is, whether it is one argument, or whether it succeeds.
Originator
Related ideas
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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