G.E.M. Anscombe
British philosopher who founded the modern philosophy of action and prompted the revival of virtue ethics.
Life
Anscombe studied at Oxford, where she became a Roman Catholic, and then at Cambridge, where she became a student and friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein. He named her one of his literary executors, and she translated the Philosophical Investigations into English.
She taught at Oxford for many years and held Wittgenstein's former chair at Cambridge from 1970 to 1986. In 1956 she publicly opposed Oxford's award of an honorary degree to President Truman, on the ground that he had ordered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Core ideas
- An intentional action is one to which a certain sense of the question “Why?” applies.
- One and the same action can be intentional under one description and not under another.
- The modern notions of moral obligation and “ought” are survivals of a divine-law ethics and make no sense without it.
- Moral philosophy should be set aside until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, including an account of virtue.
- She introduced the term “consequentialism” for theories that judge acts solely by outcomes.
In more depth
Intention. Anscombe's short book asks what makes an action intentional. Her answer is that intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question Why? applies, the sense in which the answer gives a reason for acting. One and the same action can be described in many ways, as moving an arm, pumping water, poisoning a household, and it may be intentional under some descriptions and not others.
Practical knowledge. An agent knows what they are intentionally doing without observing it. This is knowledge of a different kind from knowledge by observation. She illustrates with a shopping list and a detective's record of the purchases. If list and purchases differ, the mistake is in the action; if record and purchases differ, the mistake is in the record. Later philosophers called this a difference in direction of fit.
Modern Moral Philosophy. This 1958 paper makes three claims. Moral philosophy cannot profitably be done until there is an adequate philosophy of psychology, of action, intention and virtue. The concepts of moral obligation and the moral ought are survivals from a conception of ethics as divine law and are harmful without it. And the differences among English moral philosophers since Sidgwick are slight, since all hold that right action is fixed by consequences. She coined the word consequentialism for this.
Its effect. The paper is generally credited with starting the revival of virtue ethics, though her own point was partly that the vocabulary of obligation makes sense only with a divine lawgiver.
Absolute prohibitions. She held that some acts, such as the killing of the innocent, may never be done whatever the consequences, and that foreseeing a death is different from intending it. On these grounds she opposed Oxford's honouring of President Truman.
Causation and the first person. She argued against Hume that causation does not require necessity or universal law, and that I is not a referring expression.
The life. Elizabeth Anscombe converted to Catholicism as a schoolgirl, studied at Oxford, and became Wittgenstein's student and friend at Cambridge. He named her one of his literary executors, and her English version of the Philosophical Investigations is the form in which most readers know it. She held the chair at Cambridge that he had held. She was married to the philosopher Peter Geach and had seven children. In 1948 she read a paper criticising C. S. Lewis's argument against naturalism, and he later revised it.
The pump. Intention builds on one example. A man moves his arm up and down, operating a pump, filling a cistern, and thereby poisoning the people in a house, who are plotting a war. Is this one action or four? One, she answers, with four descriptions, each related to the next as means to end. The question “why?” applies in turn: why are you moving your arm? To pump. Why pump? To poison them. The series shows the structure of intention in the action itself.
The shopping list. A man goes round a shop with a list, followed by a detective who writes down what he buys. If the list and the purchases differ, the mistake is in the man's action. If the detective's record and the purchases differ, the mistake is in the record. The two lists relate to the same facts in opposite ways. Later philosophers named this difference direction of fit and used it to distinguish desire from belief.
Brute facts. In a short paper she observes that some facts hold in virtue of others in a context of institutions. That the grocer delivered potatoes and sent a bill is, in normal circumstances, what it is for me to owe him money. Owing is not an extra fact added to these, nor does it follow from them by logic alone. The idea was later used against the claim that no “ought” can be derived from an “is”.
Contraception and war. Her moral views were unyielding. She defended the Catholic teaching on contraception in print, and she condemned as murder the deliberate killing of the innocent in war, which is why she opposed Truman's degree.
Works
- Intention, 1957
- Modern Moral Philosophy, 1958
- An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 1959
A common misreading
A debate with C.S. Lewis in 1948 is often said to have so humiliated him that he gave up philosophical argument. Anscombe herself thought this account exaggerated; Lewis revised the criticised chapter in response.
Influenced by
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Gottlob Frege
Influenced
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Open G.E.M. Anscombe in the interactive Atlas, with lessons, quizzes, the map and the timeline.