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Rudolf Carnap

1891 CE – 1970 CE · Germany; Vienna and Prague; United States · European

Leading member of the Vienna Circle, who used formal logic to reconstruct scientific knowledge and to reject metaphysics as meaningless.

Life

Carnap was born in Germany, studied physics and philosophy, and attended Gottlob Frege's lectures at Jena. In 1926 he joined the University of Vienna and became a central figure of the Vienna Circle. He moved to Prague in 1931.

With the rise of Nazism he emigrated to the United States in 1935, teaching at Chicago and later at the University of California, Los Angeles. He worked in his later years on semantics, modal logic and the logic of probability.

Core ideas

In more depth

Construction. The Aufbau attempts to show how all the concepts of science can be defined, step by step, from a single base of elementary experiences and one relation, remembered similarity, using the new logic. Physical objects, other minds and cultural objects are built in successive layers. The work was inspired by Russell and is the most ambitious execution of the empiricist programme.

Against metaphysics. A statement has meaning only if it is analytic or if some possible experience would bear on its truth. Metaphysical sentences fail the test in one of two ways. They contain words with no empirical criteria, or they violate logical syntax while obeying grammar. His example is Heidegger's the nothing itself nothings. Metaphysics expresses an attitude to life, as music does, but poses as theory.

Tolerance. In The Logical Syntax of Language he states the principle of tolerance: in logic there are no morals. Anyone may build a language as they wish, provided they state its rules clearly. Disputes in philosophy are often really proposals about which language to adopt, and are to be judged by usefulness.

Internal and external questions. Within a linguistic framework, questions such as whether there are prime numbers above a hundred have straightforward answers. The external question whether numbers really exist is not a theoretical question at all. It is the practical question of whether to adopt the framework.

Explication. Philosophy's positive task is to replace vague ordinary concepts with exact ones that do the same work better. He applied this to probability, developing an inductive logic of degrees of confirmation, and to meaning and necessity.

Criticism. The verification principle proved hard to state in a way that admitted science and excluded metaphysics, and Carnap weakened it repeatedly. His pupil Quine attacked the analytic and synthetic distinction on which the whole approach rests. Their long exchange is among the central debates of the century.

The Vienna Circle. Carnap joined the group around Moritz Schlick in Vienna in 1926. Its members, mostly trained in physics and mathematics, read the Tractatus line by line and held that the task of philosophy is the logical analysis of the language of science. Their 1929 manifesto announced a scientific world conception. Carnap moved to Prague, and at the end of 1935, with the rise of Nazism, to the United States, where he taught at Chicago and then Los Angeles.

The example of Heidegger. In a paper of 1932 Carnap takes sentences from a lecture by Heidegger, including “the nothing itself nothings”, and argues that they break the rules of logical syntax. “Nothing” is used as a name when it functions in ordinary speech as a quantifier: “nothing is outside” does not name something that is outside. Metaphysical sentences of this kind are not false. They express an attitude toward life, and metaphysicians are, he says, musicians without musical ability.

From verification to confirmation. The early criterion said a sentence is meaningful if it can be verified. Universal laws cannot be conclusively verified, so Carnap replaced the requirement with confirmability: a sentence is empirical if observations can count for or against it to some degree. He spent much of his later career constructing an inductive logic meant to assign a degree of confirmation to a hypothesis given evidence.

Meaning and necessity. Carnap developed a semantics in which each expression has an extension, what it applies to, and an intension, what determines its extension in every possible state of affairs. Necessary truths are those true in all state descriptions. This framework fed directly into later possible-worlds semantics. His replies to critics in the volume devoted to him remain a model of patient argument.

The man. Carnap was a socialist and a pacifist by conviction, supported the international language Esperanto, and refused to sign a loyalty oath required in California in the 1950s. Quine, his chief critic, called him his greatest teacher.

Works

A common misreading

Carnap is often pictured as a rigid dogmatist. He revised his views repeatedly in response to criticism and abandoned strict verificationism early.

Influenced by

Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Immanuel Kant, David Hume

Influenced

W.V.O. Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, David Lewis

Related ideas

Verification principle

Schools and eras

Logical Positivism, Analytic

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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