Bertrand Russell
British logician and public intellectual who helped found analytic philosophy and tried to reduce mathematics to logic.
Life
Russell was born into an aristocratic family, orphaned young, and raised by his grandmother; John Stuart Mill was his secular godfather. At Cambridge he broke with idealism alongside G.E. Moore. With A.N. Whitehead he spent a decade writing Principia Mathematica.
He was dismissed from Trinity College and later imprisoned for opposing the First World War. He wrote widely for the public, received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950, and campaigned against nuclear weapons into his nineties.
Core ideas
- Logicism: mathematics can be derived from logic, using a theory of types to avoid the paradox he discovered in 1901.
- The Theory of descriptions: phrases such as “the present King of France” are not names and disappear on analysis.
- Knowledge by acquaintance is distinct from knowledge by description.
- Logical atomism: the world consists of simple facts that an ideal language would mirror.
- Philosophy should adopt the methods and the tentativeness of science.
In more depth
Logicism and the paradox. Russell independently reached Frege's view that mathematics reduces to logic, and discovered the paradox that broke Frege's system. His solution, worked out in Principia Mathematica with Whitehead, was the theory of types: classes are arranged in a hierarchy, and a class cannot be a member of itself. The price was additional axioms, such as that of infinity, which do not look like truths of logic.
Descriptions. A sentence such as the present King of France is bald seems to be about someone, yet there is no such person. Russell argues that its grammatical form misleads. Properly analysed it says: there is exactly one thing that is at present King of France, and that thing is bald. This is simply false. Definite descriptions are not names and have no meaning in isolation. The analysis became a model of how logic could dissolve philosophical puzzles.
Acquaintance. We know some things directly, by acquaintance: sense-data, and perhaps universals and ourselves. Everything else we know by description. Every proposition we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. Physical objects are, in his middle period, treated as logical constructions out of sense-data.
Logical atomism. The world consists of independent facts, and a logically perfect language would mirror their structure. Analysis ends in atomic propositions that correspond to atomic facts. He developed this in conversation with the young Wittgenstein, whose criticisms then led him to abandon parts of it.
Later views. He moved to a neutral monism in which mind and matter are constructed from the same events, and in Human Knowledge examined the principles that scientific inference requires and experience cannot justify.
Ethics and public life. He held that ethical statements express desires and are not true or false, while campaigning all his life with moral passion, a tension he acknowledged. He changed his mind often and said so, which he regarded as a merit.
The conversion from idealism. Russell and Moore were trained at Cambridge in the British idealism of Bradley, on which reality is a single whole and separate facts are appearances. Around 1898 they rebelled. Russell describes it as an escape from a hot-house onto a wind-swept headland: he now believed that grass is green, that the sun and stars would exist if no one were aware of them, and that mathematics is true in its own right. The new philosophy took relations between distinct things as real.
The puzzles that the theory solves. On Denoting sets itself three tests. If George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley, and Scott was that author, did he wish to know whether Scott was Scott? Is the present King of France bald or not bald, given that he is on neither list? And how can “the round square does not exist” be true if there is nothing for it to be about? Analysing descriptions as statements of existence and uniqueness answers all three.
The barber and the classes. A village barber shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves: who shaves the barber? The story illustrates the paradox Russell found in Frege's system. The class of all classes that are not members of themselves is a member of itself just in case it is not. Russell's remedy was to rank objects, classes of objects, classes of classes, and so on, and to rule out as meaningless any statement that crosses the ranks improperly.
The value of philosophy. The Problems of Philosophy ends by arguing that philosophy is to be studied not for definite answers, which as a rule it cannot give, but for the questions themselves. They enlarge our conception of what is possible and diminish dogmatic assurance. The person with no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices of common sense.
Public life. Russell was dismissed from Trinity College and later sentenced to six months in prison for his opposition to the First World War. He wrote widely on marriage, education and religion, was denied a post in New York in 1940 after a court found him morally unfit, received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950, and in his late eighties was jailed again for a week for nuclear disarmament protests.
Works
- The Principles of Mathematics, 1903
- On Denoting, 1905
- Principia Mathematica (with A.N. Whitehead), 1910–1913
- The Problems of Philosophy, 1912
- A History of Western Philosophy, 1945
A common misreading
His Nobel Prize was for literature, in recognition of his writings on humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought, not for his work in logic or philosophy.
Influenced by
Gottlob Frege, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, G.E. Moore
Influenced
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, W.V.O. Quine, Karl Popper, Saul Kripke
Related ideas
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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