W.V.O. Quine
American logician who rejected the analytic–synthetic distinction and held that philosophy is continuous with natural science.
Life
Quine was born in Akron, Ohio, and took his doctorate at Harvard in two years. A travelling fellowship in 1932–1933 took him to Vienna, Prague and Warsaw, where he met Rudolf Carnap, the decisive influence on his career and his lifelong sparring partner.
He taught at Harvard from 1936 until retirement, with a break for naval intelligence work in the Second World War.
Core ideas
- There is no principled distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.
- Holism: our beliefs face experience as a whole, not one by one, and any of them can be revised.
- “To be is to be the value of a variable”: we are committed to the existence of whatever our best theories quantify over.
- Translation is indeterminate; there is no fact about which of several adequate translation schemes is correct.
- Naturalised epistemology: the study of knowledge is a chapter of psychology.
In more depth
Two dogmas. Modern empiricism, Quine argues, rests on two unsupported beliefs. The first is that there is a sharp distinction between analytic truths, true by meaning alone, and synthetic ones. Every attempt to explain analyticity appeals to notions such as synonymy that are no clearer. The second is reductionism, that each meaningful statement can be confirmed or refuted by experience taken singly.
The web of belief. In place of these he proposes that our statements face the tribunal of experience as a corporate body. Knowledge is a web that touches experience only at its edges. When a prediction fails, there is a choice about what to revise. Any statement can be held true if drastic enough adjustments are made elsewhere, and none is immune to revision, not even the laws of logic. The difference between a central and a peripheral belief is one of degree.
Ontology. To be is to be the value of a bound variable. A theory is committed to those entities that must exist for its statements to be true. We should accept what our best science requires and no more. Quine reluctantly admitted abstract objects such as sets because mathematics is indispensable to physics.
Indeterminacy of translation. A linguist translating an unknown language hears gavagai when a rabbit runs by. All the evidence there could be, which is behaviour in observable circumstances, is compatible with translating it as rabbit, undetached rabbit part or rabbit stage. Quine concludes that there is no fact about which is correct. Meaning, conceived as something determinate that sentences have, is a myth.
Naturalised epistemology. The old project of justifying science from a standpoint outside it has failed. Epistemology should become a part of psychology, studying how a human subject gets from sensory input to theory. Critics reply that this abandons the question of justification altogether.
Legacy. Naturalism, the view that philosophy is continuous with science, became the default position in much later analytic philosophy.
Circularity. Two Dogmas argues that analyticity cannot be explained. Say a statement is analytic when it turns into a logical truth by replacing synonyms: “no bachelor is married” becomes “no unmarried man is married”. But synonymy needs explaining. By definition? Dictionaries record synonymy; they do not create it. By interchangeability in all contexts? That works only in a language with the word “necessarily”, which already presupposes analyticity. Each notion is defined by another in the same circle.
Gavagai. A linguist meets a people whose language is wholly unknown. A rabbit runs by and a speaker says “gavagai”. The linguist writes “rabbit”. But the same evidence fits “undetached rabbit part”, “rabbit stage” or “rabbithood again”. Further questions can be asked only by using other words whose translation is equally open. Quine concludes that rival manuals of translation could fit all the behaviour and yet disagree, and that there is no fact of the matter which is right.
Neurath's boat. Quine often cites Otto Neurath's image: we are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to bring it into dry dock and start from the best materials. There is no standpoint outside our theory of the world from which to assess it. We revise from within, plank by plank. This is why he rejects first philosophy and treats the theory of knowledge as part of science.
What there is. On What There Is begins by asking the question in three words and answering in one: everything. The work is in saying what is included. We are committed to whatever our best theory, written in the notation of logic, requires its variables to range over. Quine reluctantly accepted sets, because mathematics is needed for science, and rejected meanings, properties and possible objects as lacking clear conditions of identity. No entity without identity.
The style. Quine wrote some of the most carefully turned prose in twentieth-century philosophy and taught at Harvard for over forty years. Saul Kripke and David Lewis were among his students, and Donald Davidson was deeply influenced by him.
Works
- On What There Is, 1948
- Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 1951
- Word and Object, 1960
- Epistemology Naturalized, 1969
A common misreading
Quine's attack on the “dogmas of empiricism” was not an attack on empiricism. He called himself an empiricist throughout and wanted a more consistent version of it.
Influenced by
Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, John Dewey
Influenced
David Lewis, Saul Kripke, Thomas Kuhn
Schools and eras
Empiricism, Pragmatism, Analytic
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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