David Hume
Scottish philosopher and historian who pressed empiricism to sceptical conclusions about causation, the self and the foundations of morals.
Life
Hume was born in Edinburgh and entered its university as a boy. He wrote A Treatise of Human Nature in his twenties, largely in France, and was disappointed by its reception; he said it “fell dead-born from the press”. He later recast its ideas in two shorter Enquiries.
His reputation for irreligion cost him university chairs at Edinburgh and Glasgow. He worked as a librarian and diplomat and became famous and wealthy through his essays and his History of England. His Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion were published after his death.
Core ideas
- All ideas are copies of earlier impressions; a term with no corresponding impression is meaningless.
- We never perceive necessary connection between cause and effect, only constant conjunction, and our expectation is a product of habit (see the Problem of induction).
- The self is “a bundle or collection of different perceptions”.
- Moral distinctions come from sentiment, not reason; one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” (see the Is–ought problem).
- A wise person proportions belief to the evidence, which tells against reports of miracles.
In more depth
The science of man. Hume proposes to apply the experimental method to human nature. All the contents of the mind are either impressions, the lively perceptions of sense and feeling, or ideas, their fainter copies. Every simple idea derives from a corresponding impression. This copy principle is a test: to find what a term means, ask from what impression its idea comes. If none can be found, the term is empty.
Causation. All reasoning about matters of fact rests on cause and effect. But when we look at a single case we see only one event followed by another, never a power or necessary connection between them. After repeated experience of similar pairs the mind passes by habit from one to the other, and the felt expectation is the source of our idea of necessity. Whether Hume holds that causation is nothing more than regular succession, or only that this is all we can know of it, divides his interpreters.
Induction. Our expectation that the future will resemble the past cannot be justified by reason. It is not a truth of logic, since a change in nature is conceivable. It cannot be supported by experience, since that would assume the very principle in question. We rely on it from custom, which is the great guide of human life.
The self and the external world. When I look inward I find only particular perceptions, never a self that has them. The mind is a bundle of perceptions in constant flux. Our belief in bodies that continue to exist unperceived is likewise a product of imagination. Hume's scepticism is mitigated: nature compels belief where reason cannot support it, and the right response is modesty.
Morals. Reason alone never moves us to act; it serves the passions by discovering means. Moral distinctions are therefore not derived from reason. They rest on sentiments of approval and disapproval, felt when we consider traits from a general point of view, and we approve what is useful or agreeable to the person or to others. He notes that writers pass without explanation from is to ought.
Religion. A miracle is a violation of laws established by uniform experience, so the evidence against it will always outweigh the testimony for it. The Dialogues take apart the argument from design: the analogy between the world and a machine is weak, and at most supports a designer with limited attributes.
Reception. Kant said that Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber, and most later theory of knowledge takes Hume's problems as given.
The fork. Hume divides the objects of inquiry into relations of ideas and matters of fact. The first, as in geometry and arithmetic, are discoverable by thought alone and their denial is contradictory. The second can always be denied without contradiction: that the sun will not rise tomorrow is as intelligible as that it will. The first Enquiry ends by applying the division. Take any volume of divinity or school metaphysics: does it contain reasoning about quantity, or about matter of fact? No. Commit it to the flames.
The billiard balls. Watch one ball strike another. You see the first move, touch the second, and the second move. You do not see any power or necessity passing between them. After many such cases you expect the second motion when you see the first, and that feeling of expectation is the only source of the idea of necessary connection. Adam, with perfect reason and no experience, could not have told from the transparency of water that it would drown him.
The missing shade of blue. Hume's first principle is that every simple idea copies a prior impression. He then offers a counterexample himself. Suppose someone has seen every shade of blue but one. Shown the shades in order with a gap, he could supply the missing one from imagination. Hume grants this and says the case is so singular that it is not worth changing the maxim for. Readers have long wondered why he printed it.
Miracles. A wise man proportions belief to evidence. A miracle is a violation of a law of nature, and the evidence for a law is as complete as experience can be. So no testimony can establish a miracle unless its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it reports. In practice the witnesses to reported miracles are never numerous, sober and disinterested enough. The essay was left out of the Treatise from caution and published in the Enquiry.
Taste and the passions. Reason, Hume says, is and ought only to be the slave of the passions: it finds means, and cannot set ends. Moral approval is a feeling that arises when we take a general point of view on a character. In aesthetics, likewise, beauty is no quality in things, yet some judges are better than others: those with delicacy, practice, comparison, freedom from prejudice and good sense. Their joint verdict is the standard of taste.
In their words
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.
Works
- A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739–1740
- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748
- An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 1751
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously, 1779
Where scholars disagree
Readers divide over whether Hume is chiefly a sceptic or a naturalist offering a science of human nature, and over whether he believed in real causal powers that we cannot perceive.
A common misreading
Hume did not deny that events have causes or advise us to stop reasoning from experience. His claim is that such reasoning rests on custom and cannot be justified by argument, and that we cannot help relying on it.
Influenced by
John Locke, George Berkeley, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, Francis Bacon
Influenced
Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Karl Popper
Related ideas
Problem of induction, Is–ought problem
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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