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Is–ought problem

The claim that conclusions about what ought to be done cannot be derived from premises that state only what is the case.

Also known as: Hume's law, Fact–value gap

Explanation

In a short paragraph of the Treatise (Book 3, Part 1, Section 1), David Hume observes that moral writers proceed for a while in the ordinary way, describing God or human affairs, and then suddenly switch from “is” and “is not” to “ought” and “ought not”. This new relation needs to be explained, he says, since it seems inconceivable that it could be deduced from the others.

The passage is usually read as showing that no set of purely factual statements entails a moral conclusion. It is often linked with G.E. G.E. Moore's later “naturalistic fallacy”, though the two points are distinct.

Critics

Philippa Foot and G.E.M. Anscombe argued that facts about human needs and practices can ground evaluative conclusions. John Searle claimed to derive an “ought” from the fact of having made a promise.

Philippa Foot, G.E.M. Anscombe

Where scholars disagree

Whether Hume meant that the derivation is impossible, or only that it is commonly made without explanation, is disputed.

Originator

David Hume

Schools

Empiricism

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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