John Searle
American philosopher of language and mind, author of the Chinese room argument and of a theory of social reality.
Life
Searle studied at Wisconsin and then at Oxford under J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson, and taught at Berkeley from 1959 for some sixty years. He took part in the Free Speech Movement there in 1964. His first work extended Austin's theory of speech acts; he then moved to the mind and to the nature of social institutions.
Core ideas
- To speak is to perform acts such as asserting, promising and ordering, governed by rules.
- Syntax is not sufficient for semantics: running a program does not produce understanding.
- Consciousness is a biological feature of the brain, caused by neural processes and not reducible to them.
- Intentionality rests on a background of capacities that are not themselves representations.
- Institutional facts exist because people collectively accept that something counts as something else.
In more depth
Speech acts. Austin had shown that saying is often doing. Searle gave the theory a system. Each kind of act has conditions for its successful performance: to promise, I must say I will do something, you must want it done, I must intend to do it, and I must undertake an obligation. He sorted all such acts into five kinds: saying how things are, trying to get someone to act, committing oneself, expressing a feeling, and bringing something about by declaring it. He also explained indirect acts: “can you pass the salt?” is a request made by way of a question.
Biological naturalism. Searle rejected both dualism and the computational theory of mind. Consciousness is caused by processes in the brain as digestion is caused by processes in the stomach. It is a real feature of the world with a first-person mode of existence, and a simulation of it is no more conscious than a simulated storm is wet. Critics from both sides said the position is unstable: either it is a form of dualism about properties or it owes an account of how brains differ from computers.
Money and marriage. Some facts exist only because we think they do. This piece of paper is a twenty-dollar bill; that man is the president. Searle's formula is: X counts as Y in context C. People collectively assign a status to something, and with the status come powers, rights and duties. Language is the basic institution, since the assignment has to be represented. The account explains how there can be an objective reality of money, property and government that depends on agreement.
Disputes. Searle's exchange with Jacques Derrida over Austin was notably hostile on both sides, and he criticised Daniel Dennett for denying the existence of what needed explaining. His derivation of an “ought” from the fact that someone made a promise is a standard reply to David Hume's gap.
Works
- Speech Acts, 1969
- Minds, Brains, and Programs, 1980
- Intentionality, 1983
- The Rediscovery of the Mind, 1992
- The Construction of Social Reality, 1995
Influenced by
J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein
Related ideas
The Chinese room, Intentionality
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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