P. F. Strawson
Oxford philosopher who revived metaphysics as the description of our basic conceptual scheme.
Life
Strawson read philosophy, politics and economics at Oxford, served in the army during the war, and taught at Oxford from 1947, succeeding Gilbert Ryle in his chair in 1968. He made his reputation at thirty-one with a criticism of Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions.
Core ideas
- Referring is something speakers do with expressions, not something expressions do on their own.
- A sentence whose subject fails to refer is neither true nor false.
- Descriptive metaphysics lays out the structure of thought about the world that we actually have.
- Material bodies and persons are the basic particulars of our scheme.
- Responsibility is grounded in reactive attitudes such as resentment and gratitude.
In more depth
Against Russell. Russell held that “the present King of France is bald” asserts that there is exactly one King of France and is therefore false. Strawson replied that the sentence itself is neither true nor false. Sentences are used by speakers on occasions; the same sentence used in 1700 would have said something true or false. Used now, it fails to say anything of either kind, because the speaker presupposes, and does not assert, that there is such a king. Russell answered sharply, and the dispute introduced the notion of presupposition to linguistics.
Persons. In Individuals Strawson asks what must be so for us to identify and re-identify particular things. The answer gives priority to bodies in a single framework of space and time. He then argues that the concept of a person is primitive: a person is a type of entity to which both bodily properties and states of consciousness are ascribed. One could not ascribe experiences to oneself unless one could ascribe them to others, and one ascribes them to others on the basis of behaviour. So neither the Cartesian ego nor the mere body comes first.
Reading Kant. The Bounds of Sense separates what Strawson took to be Kant's lasting achievement, an argument about the necessary structure of any experience we can make intelligible, from the doctrine that we know only appearances. For experience to be of an objective world, it must be possible to distinguish how things are from how they seem, and this requires a unified consciousness that can ascribe experiences to itself.
Freedom and resentment. Suppose someone treads on my hand. How I feel depends on whether it was an accident or done from contempt. Resentment, gratitude and forgiveness respond to the good or ill will others show us. With a child or someone deranged we take an objective attitude. Strawson argues that the debate over determinism has ignored these facts. The reactive attitudes are a given of human life, and it is not in our nature, nor would it be rational, to give them up.
Works
- On Referring, 1950
- Individuals, 1959
- Freedom and Resentment, 1962
- The Bounds of Sense, 1966
Influenced by
Immanuel Kant, J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein
Influenced
Related ideas
Moral responsibility, Theory of descriptions
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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