Atlas of Philosophy

All entries › Ideas

The Chinese room

Searle's argument that running a program is not sufficient for understanding.

Explanation

Imagine a person who knows no Chinese locked in a room with a rule book in English. Chinese characters are passed in; by following the rules, which refer only to the shapes of the symbols, he passes back other characters. To those outside, the answers are indistinguishable from a native speaker's. Yet he understands nothing. He has done everything a computer does when it runs a program.

John Searle concludes, in a paper of 1980, that programs manipulate symbols by their form alone, that minds have meaning or content, and that form is not sufficient for content. So no program, however good its outputs, thereby understands. He directed this against what he called strong artificial intelligence.

Critics

The systems reply says that the man is only a part; the whole system of man, book and room understands. The robot reply adds sensors and limbs. The brain-simulator reply imagines a program that copies the firing of a Chinese speaker's neurons. Searle answered each, and Daniel Dennett and others answered him.

Daniel Dennett

Where scholars disagree

There is no agreement on what, if anything, the argument proves. The question has become practical with systems that produce fluent language.

Originator

John Searle

Related ideas

Functionalism, The hard problem of consciousness, Intentionality

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Open The Chinese room in the interactive Atlas, with lessons, quizzes, the map and the timeline.

This page is part of the ideas list. How this content was made, and its limits, are described in the Terms of use.