Intentionality
The feature of mental states by which they are about, or directed at, something.
Explanation
To believe is to believe something; to fear is to fear something; to see is to see something. This “aboutness” is intentionality. The word comes from the Latin intentio, from tendere, to stretch or aim toward, and has nothing specially to do with intending to act. The medieval Scholastics discussed it, and Franz Brentano revived it in 1874, proposing that it is the mark that distinguishes mental from physical phenomena.
Edmund Husserl, Brentano's student, made it the central theme of phenomenology. He analysed how each conscious act presents its object in a particular way, and noted that the object need not exist: one can think about a golden mountain. In analytic philosophy the question became how physical systems such as brains could have states with content.
Critics
Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty argued that our basic relation to the world is practical and bodily involvement, which is prior to any act of consciousness directed at an object. W.V.O. Quine doubted that intentional notions have a place in science.
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, W.V.O. Quine
Originator
Related ideas
Schools
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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