J. L. Austin
Oxford philosopher who founded the theory of speech acts and made the close study of ordinary language a method.
Life
Austin read classics at Oxford and taught there all his life. During the Second World War he was a senior intelligence officer and directed the analysis that prepared the Normandy landings. He published only seven papers. His two books were reconstructed from lecture notes after his early death from cancer.
Core ideas
- Some utterances do not describe an act; they perform it.
- Every utterance involves saying something, doing something in saying it, and bringing about effects by saying it.
- Performatives are not true or false but can misfire or be abused.
- Ordinary language embodies distinctions people have found worth drawing over many generations.
- Arguments from illusion for sense-data rest on misuse of words such as “looks” and “real”.
In more depth
Performatives. “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.” “I bet you sixpence it will rain.” “I do”, said at a wedding. In saying these things one is not reporting a naming, a bet or a marriage. One is doing it. Such utterances are neither true nor false. They can go wrong in other ways: if I am not the person appointed to name the ship, the act misfires; if I promise with no intention of keeping my word, the act is performed but abused. Austin called these failures infelicities.
Three acts. Austin then found that the contrast between performing and stating breaks down, since stating is also an act with its own conditions. He replaced it with a general theory. In any utterance there is a locutionary act, saying words with a certain sense; an illocutionary act, what is done in saying them, such as warning or promising; and a perlocutionary act, the effect produced, such as alarming or persuading. Philosophy had attended only to the first.
Excuses. To study action, Austin recommended studying the ways it goes wrong. We say a thing was done by mistake, by accident, inadvertently, unintentionally. These are not the same. If I shoot your donkey thinking it is mine, that is a mistake; if I aim at mine and yours steps into the line of fire, that is an accident. Ordinary language, he said, is not the last word, but it is the first word.
Real. In Sense and Sensibilia Austin took apart the argument that because a stick looks bent in water, what we directly see is never the stick but an appearance. The word “real”, he observed, has no fixed meaning; it gets a meaning from what it excludes in a context: a real duck as opposed to a decoy or a toy. Asked about knowledge, he noted that “I know” works like “I promise”: it gives others my word.
Works
- Other Minds, 1946
- A Plea for Excuses, 1956
- How to Do Things with Words, 1962
- Sense and Sensibilia, 1962
Influenced by
Influenced
John Searle, P. F. Strawson, Jacques Derrida
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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