Hilary Putnam
American philosopher of mind, language and science, known for functionalism, Twin Earth, and for changing his mind.
Life
Putnam was the son of a translator and writer, studied under Reichenbach, and made contributions to mathematical logic, including work on Hilbert's tenth problem. He taught at Harvard from 1965. He was active against the Vietnam War and for some years a member of a Maoist group, and later returned to the practice of Judaism. He repeatedly criticised positions he had himself made standard.
Core ideas
- Functionalism: mental states are defined by their causal roles and can be realised in different materials.
- Meanings are not in the head: what a word refers to depends on the environment and on experts in the community.
- The no-miracles argument: the success of science would be a miracle if its theories were not approximately true.
- A brain that had always been in a vat could not truly think that it was one.
- There is no sharp dichotomy between facts and values.
In more depth
Twin Earth. Imagine a planet exactly like Earth except that the clear liquid in its lakes is not H2O but a different compound, XYZ, with the same appearance. In 1750 no one on either planet could tell the difference. An Earthling and his twin are in the same psychological state when they say “water”. Yet the Earthling's word refers to H2O and the twin's to XYZ. Putnam concludes that meanings are not fixed by what is in the head. He adds a second point: I cannot tell an elm from a beech, yet my words refer to different trees, because I rely on experts. There is a division of linguistic labour.
Machines and minds. In papers of the 1960s Putnam argued that pain cannot be identified with a particular brain state, since creatures with very different brains feel pain. A mental state is like a state of a computing machine, defined by its relations to inputs, outputs and other states. This functionalism became the dominant view. In 1988 he argued against it: the content of thought depends on the environment and on interpretation, and cannot be captured by any computational description.
Three realisms. Putnam first defended scientific realism. Around 1976 he turned to what he called internal realism: truth is what would be justified under ideal conditions, and the idea of the world as it is apart from all description makes no sense. The brain-in-a-vat argument belongs to this period. In the 1990s, influenced by William James and by Austin, he adopted a natural realism on which perception puts us in direct contact with things.
Facts and values. Words such as “cruel” describe and evaluate at once and cannot be split into two components. Science itself is guided by values such as coherence and simplicity. So the claim that statements of fact are objective and statements of value are not cannot be sustained. He applied the point to economics, in sympathy with the work of Amartya Sen.
Works
- The Meaning of “Meaning”, 1975
- Reason, Truth and History, 1981
- The Many Faces of Realism, 1987
- The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 2002
Influenced by
W.V.O. Quine, Rudolf Carnap, Immanuel Kant, William James, Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Dewey
Influenced
Related ideas
Functionalism, The brain in a vat
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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