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Functionalism

The view that a mental state is defined by what it does, not by what it is made of.

Explanation

On this view, pain is whatever state is typically caused by bodily damage, causes distress and the desire to be rid of it, and produces avoidance and wincing. Any state that plays this causal role is pain, whether it is realised in neurons, in silicon, or in the physiology of an octopus. Hilary Putnam introduced the idea in the 1960s by comparing the mind to the program of a computer, which can run on different machines.

Functionalism replaced two earlier views: behaviourism, which ignored inner states, and the identity theory, which tied each mental state to one kind of brain state and so denied minds to creatures built differently. It became the working assumption of cognitive science.

Critics

The main objections concern experience. A system might have the right organisation and no inner life, or two people might be functionally alike while one sees red where the other sees green. John Searle's The Chinese room is aimed at the computational version. Hilary Putnam himself later gave the view up.

John Searle, Thomas Nagel

Where scholars disagree

Whether roles are fixed by common-sense psychology or by science, and how to handle experience, remain open.

Originator

Hilary Putnam

Related ideas

The Chinese room, The hard problem of consciousness, Mind–body dualism

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Open Functionalism in the interactive Atlas, with lessons, quizzes, the map and the timeline.

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