David Lewis
American metaphysician best known for holding that all possible worlds are as real as our own.
Life
Lewis was born in Oberlin, Ohio, and turned from chemistry to philosophy after a year at Oxford, where he heard Gilbert Ryle and others. He wrote his doctorate at Harvard under W.V.O. Quine and taught at Princeton from 1970 until his death.
He was a frequent visitor to Australia and close to its philosophers. In papers on a great range of topics he built up a systematic philosophy of unusual consistency.
Core ideas
- Modal realism: there exist countless concrete worlds, and “actual” simply means the one we are in.
- Individuals exist in only one world but have counterparts in others.
- Counterfactual statements are true or false according to what happens in the most similar possible worlds.
- Causation can be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependence.
- Humean supervenience: everything about a world is fixed by the arrangement of local qualities across space and time.
In more depth
Convention. Lewis's first book answers Quine's doubt that language could be conventional without a prior agreement. A convention is a regularity in behaviour that solves a recurring coordination problem, sustained because each expects the others to conform and prefers to conform if they do. No agreement is needed.
Counterfactuals. A statement such as if the match had been struck it would have lit is true if, among the possible worlds where the match is struck, those most similar to the actual world are ones where it lights. He used this to analyse causation: one event causes another if, had the first not occurred, the second would not have.
Modal realism. What are these possible worlds? Lewis's answer is that they are concrete universes, as real as ours and spatially and temporally unconnected with it. Actual simply means this one, as here means this place. Individuals exist in only one world but have counterparts in others. He granted that the view meets with an incredulous stare, and argued that its theoretical benefits, a unified account of possibility, properties, propositions and counterfactuals, justify the cost.
Humean supervenience. All there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, one little thing and then another. Laws of nature, causation and chance supervene on that pattern: there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. Laws are the generalisations that belong to the best systematisation of the facts, balancing simplicity and strength.
Mind. Mental states are defined by their causal roles, and are identical with whatever physical states fill those roles.
Method. Lewis held that philosophy rarely refutes a position outright. It measures the price of holding it. His systematic metaphysics set the terms of debate for a generation.
The argument for worlds. Lewis's case is one of cost and benefit. I believe, he wrote, that things could have been otherwise in countless ways; I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ways things could have been. Taking these to be worlds like ours lets us analyse possibility, counterfactuals, properties, propositions and causation in one framework. The theory earns its keep by its usefulness, as sets do in mathematics. The usual response, he said, was an incredulous stare, which is not an argument.
Counterparts. No individual exists in more than one world. When I say that Humphrey might have won the election, what makes it true is that in another world a counterpart of Humphrey, someone who resembles him closely in the relevant respects, wins. Kripke objected that Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, however like him, wins in another world. Lewis replied that this is what it is for Humphrey himself to have the possibility of winning.
Causation. An event causes another, on Lewis's first account, if the second depends counterfactually on the first: had the first not occurred, the second would not have. The analysis faces cases of pre-emption, where a backup would have produced the effect anyway, and Lewis revised it more than once. His paper on time travel argues that a traveller cannot kill his grandfather, though in one sense he can, and that this is no contradiction.
The best system. A law of nature, for Lewis, is a regularity that appears as an axiom or theorem in the true deductive system that best balances simplicity and strength. Laws do not govern; they summarise. Chance is fitted in by his Principal Principle, which ties rational degrees of belief to known objective chances. He admitted that chance was the big bad bug in the Humean picture.
Mind and holes. Mental states are defined by the causal roles that common-sense psychology assigns them, and are then identified with whatever physical states play those roles. A paper on mad pain and Martian pain tests the view. With his wife Stephanie he wrote a dialogue on whether holes exist. He taught at Princeton and spent part of most years in Australia, where his influence was greatest.
Works
- Convention, 1969
- Counterfactuals, 1973
- On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986
A common misreading
Lewis's possible worlds are not the “many worlds” of quantum mechanics. They are completely isolated from one another in space, time and causation, and he argued for them on grounds of philosophical usefulness.
Influenced by
W.V.O. Quine, David Hume, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Rudolf Carnap, Saul Kripke
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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