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The hard problem of consciousness

The problem of explaining why physical processes in the brain are accompanied by experience at all.

Explanation

Science can in principle explain how the brain discriminates stimuli, integrates information, controls behaviour and reports its own states. David Chalmers, in 1995, called these the easy problems, since they ask for mechanisms that perform functions. The hard problem is different: why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience, by there being something it is like to see red or feel pain?

Chalmers argues that no account of structure and function can answer this, because one can always ask why that structure is accompanied by experience. He concludes that consciousness is a further basic feature of the world. The idea has earlier forms in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's mill and in Thomas Nagel's question about what it is like to be a bat.

Critics

Daniel Dennett holds that once the functions are explained nothing is left over, and that the sense of a further problem is an illusion to be explained. Others accept the gap in our understanding but deny that it shows a gap in nature.

Daniel Dennett, John Searle

Where scholars disagree

Philosophers divide over whether the problem is real and unsolved, real but beyond human understanding, or the product of a confused concept of experience.

Related ideas

Mary's room, Functionalism, Mind–body dualism, The Chinese room

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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