John Duns Scotus
Franciscan theologian known for the univocity of being, the “thisness” of individuals and a strong doctrine of free will.
Life
Scotus was probably born at Duns in the Scottish Borders and entered the Franciscan order as a boy. He studied and lectured at Oxford and then at Paris, from which he was briefly expelled in 1303 for siding with the pope against the French king.
In 1307 he was sent to teach at Cologne, where he died the following year, aged about forty-two. He left his main works unfinished, and his difficult texts were assembled by followers.
Core ideas
- Univocity: “being” is said in the same sense of God and of creatures.
- Each individual has a positive principle of individuation, later called haecceity or “thisness”.
- The formal distinction: a real difference that falls short of a difference between separate things.
- The will is a power for opposites and is not determined by the intellect's judgement.
In more depth
Univocity of being. Aquinas held that words apply to God and creatures only by analogy. Scotus argues that unless some concepts, being above all, have exactly the same meaning in both cases, we could not reason from creatures to God at all, since every such argument would trade on two senses of a word. God and creatures differ infinitely in reality, but the bare concept of being applies to both.
Common natures and thisness. What makes Socrates this individual and not merely a human? Not matter, as Aquinas held, since matter too needs individuating. Scotus holds that the nature humanity is of itself neither one nor many, and that in each individual it is contracted by a further positive principle, an individual difference later called haecceity or thisness. The nature and the thisness are not two things, yet they are distinct in the thing prior to any act of mind: this is his formal distinction.
Will and freedom. The will is a power for opposites. At the very moment it wills one thing it retains the capacity to will otherwise. This synchronic account of contingency replaced the older view that what is, when it is, is necessary. In a well-known account drawn from Anselm, the will has two inclinations, one toward its own advantage and one toward justice, and freedom lies in the capacity to moderate the first by the second. Scholars note that this may not be his final view, since a later lecture report denies that the two are really distinct from the will itself.
God's will and morality. Because God's will is free, the created order is thoroughly contingent. Scotus holds that the commandments about our duties to God are necessary, while those about duties to our neighbour depend on God's will and could have been otherwise, though they are in harmony with the first.
Proof of God. His argument for a first being is among the most intricate of the Middle Ages. It reasons from the possibility of something's being produced to the possibility, and then the necessity, of a first cause, and so does not depend on any contingent fact about the world.
The formal distinction. Scotus introduces a distinction midway between a real difference of things and a difference made only by the mind. Two items are formally distinct when they are really one thing and inseparable, yet each has its own definition which does not include the other. He uses it for the divine attributes, for the powers of the soul, and for the common nature and the thisness in an individual. Critics, Ockham among them, thought it multiplied entities under another name.
Knowing the individual. Aristotelians held that the intellect grasps universals and the senses grasp individuals. Scotus distinguishes abstractive cognition, which considers a thing apart from whether it exists, from intuitive cognition, which is of a thing as present and existing. The intellect has both. This distinction passed to Ockham and shaped fourteenth-century debates about certainty and about whether God could cause us to have intuitive cognition of what does not exist.
The will as a rational power. Scotus reverses a common classification. The intellect is a natural power: presented with evidence it cannot but assent. The will alone is rational in the full sense, because it alone can determine itself to opposites. This is the basis of what is called voluntarism: the view that the will is not bound to follow the judgement of the intellect, and that freedom is located in the will itself.
Mary and the name. Scotus defended the doctrine that Mary was conceived without original sin, against the view of most theologians of his day, arguing that the most perfect redemption would preserve and not merely cure. The Catholic Church defined the doctrine in 1854. His followers were numerous for centuries, but Renaissance humanists mocked the subtlety of the “Dunsmen”, and from their name comes the English word dunce.
Works
- Lectura, c. 1298–1300
- Ordinatio, c. 1300–1308 (unfinished)
- Quodlibetal Questions, c. 1306–1307
A common misreading
The word “dunce” comes from his name. It was coined in the sixteenth century by humanist opponents of his followers, the “Dunsmen”, and says nothing about his ability.
Influenced by
Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas
Influenced
William of Ockham, Charles Sanders Peirce, Martin Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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