Charles Sanders Peirce
American logician and scientist who founded pragmatism and the modern theory of signs.
Life
Peirce was the son of a Harvard mathematician and trained as a chemist. He worked for three decades as a scientist for the United States Coast Survey, making precise measurements of gravity. He lectured on logic at Johns Hopkins University from 1879 until he was dismissed in 1884, and never held another academic post.
He spent his last decades in poverty in rural Pennsylvania, supported in part by his friend William James. He published a great many papers but no philosophical book, and left a vast body of manuscripts.
Core ideas
- The pragmatic maxim: the meaning of a concept lies in the conceivable practical effects of its object.
- Inquiry is the struggle to move from doubt to settled belief, and the scientific method is the only reliable way of doing so.
- Fallibilism: any of our beliefs may turn out to be wrong.
- Truth is the opinion that inquiry would ultimately converge on.
- A theory of signs (icon, index, symbol) and of abduction, the inference to an explanatory hypothesis.
In more depth
The pragmatic maxim. To make an idea clear, consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive its object to have. Our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. To call a thing hard is to say it will not be scratched by many other substances. A dispute that makes no possible difference to experience is empty. Peirce meant this as a rule for clarifying concepts, and when James turned it into a theory of truth he renamed his own view pragmaticism.
Doubt and belief. Belief is a habit of action. Doubt is an irritation that prompts inquiry, and inquiry ends when belief is settled. Descartes' attempt to doubt everything is make-believe: we cannot doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts. He compares four ways of fixing belief: tenacity, authority, what is agreeable to reason, and science. Only the last submits belief to something independent of what anyone thinks.
Truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. Truth is thus tied to the long run of inquiry by a community. Every present belief may be mistaken; he called this fallibilism.
Three kinds of inference. Besides deduction and induction there is abduction, the forming of an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only kind of reasoning that introduces a new idea, and science depends on it.
Signs. A sign stands for an object to an interpretant, a further sign in the mind of the interpreter. Signs are icons when they resemble their objects, indices when they are connected with them in fact, and symbols when they signify by convention. All thought is in signs.
Categories. He held that three categories, quality, reaction and mediation, are found in all experience, and that chance is a real feature of the world. His writings were scattered and largely unpublished in his lifetime, and their unity is still being worked out.
The four methods. In The Fixation of Belief Peirce describes four ways of settling opinion. Tenacity: hold to what you already believe and avoid anything that might disturb it. Authority: let an institution fix belief and punish dissent. The a priori method: adopt what is agreeable to reason, which makes inquiry a matter of taste. The method of science: let belief be fixed by something on which our thinking has no effect. Only the last can correct itself.
An example of the maxim. What do we mean by calling a thing hard? That it will not be scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of the quality lies in its conceived effects. Peirce then applied the maxim to a Catholic doctrine: to say that wine is blood while it has all the sensible effects of wine is, he argued, senseless jargon. In later years he regretted the narrowness of his first statement and insisted that the maxim concerns what would happen, not only what does.
Abduction. Deduction draws out what a hypothesis implies; induction tests it against cases. Neither supplies the hypothesis. Peirce gives the form of the third inference: a surprising fact is observed; if a certain hypothesis were true, the fact would be a matter of course; so there is reason to suspect that the hypothesis is true. He held that the human mind has a natural tendency to guess right, without which science could not have begun.
Icon, index, symbol. A sign may stand for its object in three ways. An icon resembles it, as a portrait or a diagram does. An index is really connected to it, as smoke is to fire or a weathervane to the wind. A symbol is connected by habit or rule, as most words are. Every sign also has an interpretant, the effect it produces in a mind, which is itself a sign. Meaning is therefore a process without a last term.
The career. Peirce worked for more than thirty years for the United States Coast Survey, making precise measurements of gravity. He lectured briefly at Johns Hopkins and was dismissed, and never held another academic post. He lived his last decades in poverty in Pennsylvania, helped by William James. Most of his writing was unpublished at his death.
Works
- The Fixation of Belief, 1877
- How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 1878
- Collected Papers, published posthumously, 1931–1958
A common misreading
Peirce did not approve of what pragmatism became. In 1905 he renamed his own view “pragmaticism”, a word he called ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.
Influenced by
Immanuel Kant, John Duns Scotus, Aristotle
Influenced
William James, John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Open Charles Sanders Peirce in the interactive Atlas, with lessons, quizzes, the map and the timeline.