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Pramana

In Indian philosophy, a source or instrument of valid cognition.

Also known as: Means of knowledge

Explanation

Indian philosophers approached the theory of knowledge by asking which processes reliably produce true cognition. Each school gave a list. The materialists accepted perception alone. Buddhists, following Dignaga and Dharmakīrti, accepted perception and inference. The Nyaya school of Akṣapāda Gautama accepted four: perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta added presumption, as when one infers that a man who is fat and does not eat by day must eat at night, and the cognition of absence.

The disputes were sharpest over testimony. For the Vedic schools the scriptures are a source of knowledge about what perception and inference cannot reach. Buddhists reduced testimony to inference from the reliability of the speaker.

Critics

Nagarjuna asked what establishes the means of knowledge themselves: if further means, there is a regress; if nothing, the claim is arbitrary. The Nyaya reply is that a lamp reveals itself along with other things.

Nagarjuna, Dignaga

Where scholars disagree

Whether validity is intrinsic to cognition or must be established from outside was debated for centuries.

Originator

Akṣapāda Gautama

Related ideas

The regress of justification, The Gettier problem

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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