Dharmakīrti
Buddhist philosopher who developed Dignāga's logic and theory of knowledge into the form debated across India for centuries.
Life
Tradition makes Dharmakīrti a South Indian brahmin who became a Buddhist monk and studied at the monastic university of Nalanda. His works are presented as commentary on Dignaga but are largely independent. A closing verse of his main work complains that no one is able to understand it, and that it will grow old in his own body like a river absorbed back into the sea.
Core ideas
- To be real is to be capable of producing an effect.
- Whatever exists is momentary.
- Perception grasps unique particulars; concepts are constructions that exclude what is other.
- A sound inference rests on a natural connection: identity of nature or causation.
- A cognition is valid if it does not deceive us in action.
In more depth
Causal power. What is it to be real? Dharmakīrti answers: to be able to do something. A real fire burns and cooks; an imagined fire does not. This is the criterion of the ultimately real, and only particulars at a place and time meet it. Universals such as “fire in general” do no causal work and are constructed by the mind. From the same criterion he argues for momentariness. A permanent thing could not produce effects, for it would either produce all of them at once or never. Since to exist is to act, and acting involves change, nothing lasts beyond a moment.
Grounding inference. Dignaga had given three formal conditions for a good reason. Dharmakīrti asks what guarantees that reason and conclusion go together, beyond our not having seen a counterexample. He allows two real connections. One is identity of nature: this is a tree because it is an oak. The other is causation: there is fire because there is smoke. A third kind of reason is non-perception: there is no pot here, because if there were, it would be seen. This gives inference a footing in the nature of things and not only in observed regularity.
Other minds and the critics. If I know only my own cognitions, how do I know that others have minds? In a short treatise he answers that I infer it from speech and action like my own, and that the idealist is no worse placed than the realist. He also argued against the existence of a creator God and against the authority of the Vedas, and against caste as a natural kind. Hindu philosophers of the Nyaya and Mimamsa schools treated him as their main opponent, and in Tibet his works became the foundation of monastic training in logic.
Works
- Commentary on Valid Cognition (Pramāṇavārttika)
- Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramāṇaviniścaya)
- A Drop of Reasoning (Nyāyabindu)
Influenced by
Influenced
Related ideas
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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