Dignaga
Founder of the Buddhist school of logic and epistemology, who recognised only perception and inference as sources of knowledge.
Life
Dignaga is reported to have been born near Kanchipuram in southern India and to have studied under Vasubandhu, though the chronology makes direct study doubtful. Later accounts say he spent much of his life in a cave in what is now Odisha.
His Compendium of Valid Cognition reshaped Indian philosophy, since Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers alike had to respond to it. The Sanskrit original is largely lost, and the work is known chiefly through Tibetan translations and through quotations.
Core ideas
- There are only two means of knowledge: perception, which grasps unique particulars, and inference, which deals in general concepts.
- Perception is free of conceptual construction.
- A valid reason has three characteristics relating it to the subject, to similar cases and to dissimilar cases.
- Apoha: a word signifies by excluding what is other; “cow” means “not non-cow”.
- Testimony and comparison are forms of inference, not independent sources.
In more depth
Two sources of knowledge. Dignaga holds that there are exactly two means of valid cognition, perception and inference, because there are two kinds of object. Perception grasps the particular, which is unique and momentary. Inference grasps the universal. Testimony and comparison, which other schools counted separately, are forms of inference.
Perception. He defines perception as cognition free of conceptual construction, with no association of name or class. The moment one judges this is a cow, one has left perception for thought. What is truly perceived cannot be put into words.
The triple condition. A sound inference needs a reason that meets three conditions. It must be present in the subject of the argument. It must be present in at least some similar cases, things that have the property to be proved. And it must be absent from all dissimilar cases. Smoke on the hill proves fire because smoke is found in the kitchen and never in the lake. His Wheel of Reasons tabulates the nine possible combinations of presence and absence and shows which yield valid, contradictory or inconclusive reasons.
Meaning by exclusion. If only particulars are real, what do general words mean? Dignaga answers with the theory of apoha. The word cow does not pick out a real universal cowness. It works by excluding what is not a cow. Universals are thus constructions of thought, useful and unreal. Hindu realists, especially Nyaya and Mimamsa thinkers, objected that one must already know cows to know non-cows.
The object of cognition. A short treatise argues that the object of a perception must both cause it and appear in it. Atoms cause but do not appear, and aggregates appear but are not real causes. So the object is an internal form that appears as if external.
Self-awareness. Every cognition is aware of itself as well as of its object, which explains memory of having experienced something.
Legacy. Dharmakirti developed his system, and the debate it provoked with the Nyaya school shaped Indian logic for centuries.
The life and the works. Dignaga lived around 480 to 540 CE. Tradition makes him a South Indian who became a pupil of Vasubandhu and lived for a time in a cave in Orissa. His main work, the Compendium on the Means of Knowledge, gathers and revises his earlier treatises. It survives only in Tibetan translation, together with fragments in Sanskrit quoted by his opponents. It opens with a verse saluting the Buddha as one who has become a means of knowledge.
The example of fire. In the standard inference, the hill has fire because it has smoke. The reason, smoke, must meet three conditions. It is present in the subject: there is smoke on the hill. It is present in similar cases: in a kitchen, where there is fire, there is smoke. It is absent from dissimilar cases: in a lake, where there is no fire, there is no smoke. Dignaga reduced the older five-member argument to what does the logical work, and distinguished inference for oneself from inference set out for another.
The wheel in outline. A reason may be present in all, some or none of the similar cases, and in all, some or none of the dissimilar cases. That gives nine combinations. Only two yield a valid reason: present in all or some similar cases and absent from all dissimilar ones. Two yield a contradictory reason, which proves the opposite. The rest are inconclusive. The table is the first systematic classification of this kind in Indian logic.
Why exclusion. If a word such as “cow” stood for a real universal, Buddhists would have to accept permanent entities. If it stood for individual cows, it could never be learned, since they are endless. Dignaga's solution is that the word works by excluding what is other: it sets aside non-cows. Nothing positive and shared need exist. The theory makes concepts products of the mind's activity of distinguishing, laid over a reality of unique particulars.
Perception and self-awareness. Perception is free from conceptual construction, which Dignaga defines as association with a name or a class. He argues that every cognition has two aspects, an appearance of the object and an appearance of itself, since otherwise we could not later remember both the thing and our knowing it. In East Asia, Buddhist logic was studied mainly through a short introduction based on his system.
Works
- Compendium of Valid Cognition (Pramanasamuccaya), c. 6th century CE
- Wheel of Reasons (Hetucakra), c. 6th century CE
- Examination of the Object (Alambanapariksa), c. 6th century CE
A common misreading
Dignaga's logic is sometimes described as an Indian version of the Aristotelian syllogism. It is a theory of evidence, about when one fact is a reliable sign of another, and differs in structure and purpose.
Influenced by
Vasubandhu, Akṣapāda Gautama, Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha)
Schools and eras
Further reading
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Open Dignaga in the interactive Atlas, with lessons, quizzes, the map and the timeline.