Philippa Foot
British moral philosopher who helped revive virtue ethics and introduced the trolley problem.
Life
Foot studied at Somerville College, Oxford, where she later taught for many years alongside G.E.M. Anscombe. From the 1970s she divided her time between Oxford and the University of California, Los Angeles.
She published mainly essays. Her one monograph, Natural Goodness, appeared when she was eighty and presented the conclusions of a lifetime's work against the view that moral judgements merely express attitudes.
Core ideas
- Moral terms are tied to facts about human good and harm; not just anything can count as a moral reason.
- The virtues are traits that human beings need in order to live well, as a plant needs strong roots.
- Evaluations of human character belong to the same logical category as evaluations of living things generally (“natural goodness”).
- The distinction between doing and allowing harm is morally significant.
- The trolley case: a driver who can steer a runaway tram from a track with five people to a track with one.
In more depth
Facts and values. The prevailing view in the 1950s was that moral judgements express attitudes or issue commands, so that anyone could without logical error approve of anything. Foot argued in Moral Beliefs that this is false. Not just anything can count as a good or a harm. To call something an injury is to say it impairs a function, and this gives everyone a reason to avoid it. Evaluation is tied to facts about human life.
The trolley case. In a paper on abortion and the doctrine of double effect she introduced the driver of a runaway tram who can steer from a track with five people on it to one with a single person. Most judge that he may. Yet a surgeon may not kill one patient to save five. She proposed that the difference lies between negative duties, not to harm, and positive duties, to aid. The driver faces a conflict between two harms; the surgeon would harm one to aid five.
Hypothetical imperatives. In a middle period she argued, against Kant, that moral requirements do not give everyone a reason to act regardless of their desires. They are like the rules of etiquette, binding only on those who care about what they serve. The moral person is a volunteer in an army.
Natural goodness. Her last book withdraws that view. Evaluations of living things depend on their kind. A plant with weak roots is defective as a plant, given how that species lives. In the same sense a human being who lacks justice or courage is defective, because human life depends on such traits. Vice is a form of natural defect, and practical rationality includes acting well.
Objections. Critics ask whether facts about the species can yield reasons for an individual who would do better by acting badly, and whether the appeal to nature fits with evolutionary biology. She remains, with Anscombe, a chief source of modern virtue ethics.
The life. Philippa Foot was a granddaughter of the American president Grover Cleveland and grew up in Yorkshire with little formal schooling. She studied at Somerville College, Oxford, alongside Anscombe, Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley. She said that her philosophy began from the newsreels of the concentration camps in 1945: no account of ethics on which moral judgement is the expression of an attitude could be adequate to that. She taught for many years at Oxford and at UCLA.
The rude and the pride. Against the view that anything can be called good by someone with the right attitude, Foot took the word “rude”. Whether behaviour is rude depends on facts: that it causes offence by showing lack of respect. One cannot call any act rude at will. And one cannot be proud of just anything, such as the sky, unless one sees it as somehow one's own achievement. Evaluation has conditions, and the same holds for “good” and “harm”.
Other cases beside the trolley. The 1967 paper contains several examples. A judge can prevent a riot that will kill many by framing an innocent man. A surgeon could save five patients by cutting up one. In a cave, a fat man is stuck in the only exit as the water rises. Foot uses them to test the doctrine of double effect and concludes that a different distinction does the work: our duty not to harm is stricter than our duty to give aid.
Why she changed her mind. In 1972 she argued that morality gives reasons only to those who care about its ends, and that moral people are volunteers. She later came to think this still granted too much to a theory of reasons based on desire. In Natural Goodness, to act well just is to act as reason requires, and someone who sees no reason to be just is, to that extent, defective as a human being.
Happiness. The last chapters ask whether virtue and happiness can come apart. She cites letters written by Germans executed for resisting the Nazis, who could say they had sacrificed their happiness and yet would not have been able to live with themselves otherwise. Happiness in the deepest sense, she suggests, is not available through wickedness.
Works
- Moral Beliefs, 1959
- The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 1967
- Virtues and Vices, 1978
- Natural Goodness, 2001
A common misreading
Foot introduced the trolley case in a 1967 article to illuminate the doctrine of double effect. The name “trolley problem” and the familiar variants, such as the footbridge case, come from Judith Jarvis Thomson.
Influenced by
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, G.E.M. Anscombe, Ludwig Wittgenstein
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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