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Personal identity

The question of what makes a person at one time the same person as someone at another time.

Explanation

You have changed nearly all your matter and many of your beliefs since childhood. What makes that child you? One answer is the soul, a simple thing that persists. John Locke rejected this: what matters is sameness of consciousness, which most readers have taken to mean memory. If a prince's consciousness entered the body of a cobbler, the resulting person would be the prince. Thomas Reid objected with the brave officer: the general remembers capturing the standard as a young officer, the officer remembered being flogged as a boy, but the general has forgotten the flogging. So the general both is and is not the boy.

Modern accounts appeal to overlapping chains of psychological connection, or to the continued life of the body or brain. David Hume and the Siddhartha Gautama (the Buddha) deny that there is a persisting self to be found at all.

Critics

Cases of fission, in which one person seems to become two, trouble every account. Derek Parfit concluded that identity is not what matters in survival.

Thomas Reid, David Hume, Derek Parfit

Where scholars disagree

Animalists hold that we are organisms, and that psychology is irrelevant to our identity.

Originator

John Locke

Related ideas

Anātman (no-self), The ship of Theseus, The Cogito

Further reading

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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