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Derek Parfit

1942 CE – 2017 CE · Chengdu, China; Oxford, England · European

British philosopher who argued that personal identity is not what matters and opened up the ethics of future generations.

Life

Parfit was born in China to parents who were doctors teaching preventive medicine in missionary hospitals, and grew up in Oxford. He read history before turning to philosophy, and spent virtually his whole career as a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, with regular visits to American universities.

He published two books. Reasons and Persons appeared in 1984; On What Matters, circulated and revised for years, appeared in three volumes from 2011.

Core ideas

In more depth

Personal identity. Parfit asks what makes a person at one time the same as a person at another. He rejects the view that it consists in a further fact, such as a soul. Identity consists in physical and psychological continuity. He then imagines cases in which continuity branches. If each half of my brain were successfully transplanted into a different body, two people would be psychologically continuous with me. I cannot be identical with both, yet this is not as bad as death.

What matters. He concludes that identity is not what matters in survival. What matters is the psychological continuity and connectedness itself, with any cause. The teletransporter cases make the same point. He reports finding this liberating: the wall between himself and others became thinner, and his death less important.

Self-defeating theories. The first part of Reasons and Persons argues that common-sense morality and the theory that each should pursue their own interest are, in different ways, self-defeating, and that the self-interest theory is unstable between morality and aiming only at one's present desires.

Future people. Our choices affect who will exist. If a policy of depletion makes life worse in two centuries, the people then alive would not have existed under another policy, so it seems the policy harms no one. This is the non-identity problem. Comparing populations of different sizes leads to the repugnant conclusion: that a vast population with lives barely worth living could be better than a smaller, flourishing one. He sought a theory that avoids it and did not claim to have found one.

On What Matters. His last work argues that the best versions of Kantian, contractualist and consequentialist ethics converge, climbing the same mountain on different sides, and defends the view that there are objective normative truths.

Response. Critics doubt that the puzzle cases tell us about real persons, and resist the claim that the moral traditions converge. His problems in population ethics remain open.

The life. Parfit was born in China to medical missionaries, studied history at Oxford, and turned to philosophy on a fellowship in America. He held a research fellowship at All Souls College for most of his career, which carried no teaching duties, and worked with extreme single-mindedness. He was also a devoted photographer of Venice and St Petersburg. Reasons and Persons appeared in 1984, and the three volumes of On What Matters in 2011 and 2017.

The teletransporter. I enter a booth on Earth. A scanner records the state of every cell, destroying my body, and the information is sent to Mars, where a replica is built from new matter. The replica has my memories and character and walks out believing he is me. Did I travel or die? Parfit argues that the question has no deep answer. All the facts are known once we know what happened to body and mind, and what matters is preserved.

The spectrum. Imagine a range of cases in which more and more of my cells are replaced, or more and more of my memories altered. At one end the resulting person is clearly me; at the other, clearly not. Anyone who thinks identity is always all-or-nothing must hold that a sharp line falls somewhere in between, at one cell or one memory. That is not believable. So personal identity can be indeterminate, like the identity of a club or a nation.

Liberation. Parfit reports that the view changed how he felt. His life had seemed like a glass tunnel through which he moved faster every year, with darkness at the end. When he changed his view, the walls disappeared. He now lived in the open air. Other people were closer, and his own death seemed less bad: after it there will be later experiences, none of them related to these in certain ways. He noted the resemblance to Buddhist teaching.

The repugnant conclusion and the mountain. If a larger population with lives barely worth living contains more total well-being, the total view says it is better than a smaller one with excellent lives. Parfit called this repugnant and spent decades seeking a theory that avoids it. In On What Matters he argued that Kantians, contractualists and consequentialists are climbing the same mountain on different sides.

Works

A common misreading

Parfit did not claim that persons do not exist. His view is reductionist: persons exist, but their existence consists in facts about bodies and experiences that can be described without presupposing identity.

Influenced by

David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, Jeremy Bentham

Schools and eras

Utilitarianism, Analytic

Further reading

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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