Alasdair MacIntyre
Scottish philosopher who argued that modern moral debate is in disorder and that ethics must return to the virtues and the traditions that sustain them.
Life
MacIntyre was educated in London and Manchester, was for a time a Marxist and a member of small Trotskyist groups, and taught in Britain before moving to the United States in 1970, where he held posts at many universities and finally at Notre Dame. In the 1980s he became a Roman Catholic and a Thomist.
Core ideas
- Modern moral language consists of fragments of older schemes whose context has been lost.
- The Enlightenment project of justifying morality by reason alone had to fail.
- A virtue is a quality that enables us to achieve the goods internal to practices.
- A human life has the unity of a narrative.
- Standards of rational justification belong to traditions of inquiry.
In more depth
The disaster. After Virtue opens with a fable. Imagine that the natural sciences were destroyed in a catastrophe and later revived from surviving fragments: half a chapter, a torn page, instruments whose use is forgotten. People would use words like “mass” and “neutrino” without the theory that gave them sense. MacIntyre claims this is the actual state of moral language. That is why disputes over war, abortion or justice go on without end: the rival premises cannot be weighed against one another. Emotivism, the view that moral statements only express preference, is false as a theory of meaning and true as a description of how such statements are now used.
Why the project failed. Ancient and medieval ethics had three parts: human nature as it happens to be, human nature as it could be if it realised its end, and the precepts that lead from one to the other. Modern thinkers dropped the idea of an end and kept the precepts. Kant, Hume and others then tried to derive the rules from untutored human nature, which the rules had been designed to correct. The choice that remains, he says, is Nietzsche or Aristotle.
Practices. A practice is a complex cooperative activity with standards of excellence, such as chess, farming, medicine or physics. It has internal goods, which can be had only by taking part well, and external goods such as money and status. A child bribed with sweets to play chess has reason to cheat; one who has come to love the game does not. Virtues are the qualities needed to gain internal goods. Institutions that house practices pursue external goods and tend to corrupt them.
Tradition and dependence. Later books argue that there is no reasoning from nowhere: rationality is exercised within traditions, which can nonetheless be compared by how well each resolves its own crises. Dependent Rational Animals corrects his earlier neglect of biology. Humans are vulnerable and dependent for much of life, and need the virtues of acknowledged dependence. After Virtue ends by saying that we are waiting for another, doubtless very different, St Benedict.
Works
- A Short History of Ethics, 1966
- After Virtue, 1981
- Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 1988
- Dependent Rational Animals, 1999
Influenced by
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Karl Marx, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.W.F. Hegel
Related ideas
Schools and eras
Further reading
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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