Donald Davidson
American philosopher who connected action, mind, meaning and truth in a single account of interpretation.
Life
Davidson studied classics and philosophy at Harvard, served in the navy in the Second World War, and came late to the work that made his name, a series of essays beginning in 1963. He was deeply influenced by W.V.O. Quine, whom he met at Harvard, and taught at Stanford, Princeton, Chicago and Berkeley.
Core ideas
- Reasons are causes: to explain an action by the agent's reasons is to give its cause.
- Anomalous monism: every mental event is a physical event, yet there are no strict laws connecting the mental and the physical.
- A theory of meaning for a language can take the form of a theory of truth for it.
- Radical interpretation: to understand others at all we must assume that most of what they believe is true.
- There are no rival conceptual schemes cut off from mutual understanding.
In more depth
Reasons as causes. Followers of Wittgenstein held that explaining an action by reasons is a different kind of explanation from giving causes. Davidson replied that a person can have a reason for an act, perform the act, and yet not have done it for that reason. What makes the difference between having a reason and acting on it? Only that the reason caused the act. The paper restored causal theories of action and set the terms for the next half-century.
Anomalous monism. Three claims seem inconsistent: mental events cause physical events; causation requires strict laws; there are no strict laws linking mental and physical. Davidson accepts all three. Each mental event is identical with some physical event and falls under a physical law under that description. But mental descriptions answer to standards of rationality and coherence that have no echo in physics, so no law connects the two vocabularies. Critics object that this leaves the mental properties with no causal work to do.
Triangulation and charity. An interpreter facing a wholly unknown language has only what speakers hold true and the circumstances in which they hold it. To get started, the interpreter must assume that the speaker's beliefs are mostly true by the interpreter's lights. Davidson concluded that massive error is impossible: belief is by its nature mostly veridical. In later essays he argued that thought requires a triangle of two creatures responding to each other and to a shared world.
Against conceptual schemes. If another group had a scheme so different from ours that it could not be translated, we would have no reason to call it a language at all. The idea of a scheme that organises a neutral content is, he said, a third dogma of empiricism. Giving it up, we do not give up the world. We re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences true or false.
Works
- Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 1963
- Truth and Meaning, 1967
- Mental Events, 1970
- On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, 1974
A common misreading
Davidson's principle of charity is not a rule to be generous. It is a claim that interpretation is impossible unless speakers are taken to be largely right.
Influenced by
W.V.O. Quine, Immanuel Kant, G.E.M. Anscombe
Influenced
Schools and eras
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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