Compatibilism
The view that free will and moral responsibility are possible even if determinism is true.
Explanation
Incompatibilists argue as follows. If determinism is true, our acts follow from the laws of nature and events before we were born. Those are not up to us. So our acts are not up to us. Some conclude that we are not free; libertarians conclude that determinism is false. Compatibilists reject the argument. For Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, to act freely is to do what one wants without being constrained. The prisoner in chains is unfree; the person who stays in a room by choice is free, even if the choice had causes.
In 1969 Harry Frankfurt described a case in which a person decides on his own to do something, while a hidden device would have forced the same decision had he wavered. He could not have done otherwise, yet he seems responsible. Frankfurt proposed that freedom consists in acting on desires one wants to have.
Critics
Immanuel Kant called the view a wretched subterfuge and William James a quagmire of evasion. Critics ask whether a person manipulated into having the right desires would be free.
Where scholars disagree
Most professional philosophers today lean toward compatibilism, but no position commands general agreement.
Originator
Related ideas
Determinism, Moral responsibility
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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