Maurice Merleau-Ponty
French phenomenologist who made the living, perceiving body the centre of our relation to the world.
Life
Merleau-Ponty studied at the École Normale Supérieure alongside Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. He served as an infantry officer in 1939–1940, and after the war co-founded Les Temps modernes with them. He drew extensively on experimental psychology and on Edmund Husserl's unpublished manuscripts.
In 1952 he was elected to the chair of philosophy at the Collège de France, unusually young. He broke with Sartre over politics the following year. He died suddenly at fifty-three, leaving a major work unfinished.
Core ideas
- Perception is our primary contact with the world, prior to science and to reflective thought.
- The body is not an object among objects but the subject of perception: “I am my body”.
- Skills and habits are a form of bodily understanding.
- Both empiricism and intellectualism misdescribe perception, the first as passive reception, the second as judgement.
- In his late work, perceiver and perceived belong to a common “flesh”.
In more depth
Against two errors. Merleau-Ponty holds that both empiricism and what he calls intellectualism misdescribe perception. Empiricism builds it from separate sensations; intellectualism makes it a judgement by a mind. Both assume a finished objective world and ask how we come to know it. Phenomenology returns to perception as it is lived, before that world has been constructed.
The lived body. I do not have my body as an object. I am it. The body is my point of view on the world and my means of having one. He distinguishes the body as an object of science from the body as lived, which has a body schema, an implicit awareness of its own posture and possibilities. Habits such as typing or driving are knowledge in the hands.
Motor intentionality. Bodily movement is directed toward things without the mediation of thought. He draws on clinical cases, such as phantom limbs and a brain-injured patient who could perform habitual actions but not abstract movements on request, to show that our basic relation to the world is practical and bodily. The body's directedness underlies the intentionality of consciousness.
Perception and ambiguity. The perceived world is not a set of determinate objects. Things are given through perspectives, with horizons of further aspects. Perception is primary: science and reflection are built upon it and never leave it behind.
Freedom. Against Sartre, freedom is always situated. I am born into a world with meanings already sedimented, and my choices take up and transform them. There is never determinism and never absolute choice.
Flesh. His unfinished last work seeks to get beyond the opposition of subject and object altogether. The hand that touches can itself be touched. Seer and seen belong to one element, which he calls flesh, and their relation is a crossing-over or chiasm.
Legacy. His account of embodiment has been taken up in cognitive science, where it supports the view that mind cannot be understood apart from the body's activity.
The life. Merleau-Ponty studied at the École Normale Supérieure alongside Sartre and Beauvoir, and was among the first to read Husserl's unpublished manuscripts at Louvain. He served as an infantry officer in 1940 and took part in the Resistance. With Sartre he edited Les Temps modernes until they broke over Soviet communism during the Korean War. He was elected to the Collège de France in 1952 and died suddenly at his desk in 1961, aged fifty-three.
Schneider. The Phenomenology of Perception returns often to a patient, Schneider, wounded in the head in the First World War. Asked to point to his nose, he cannot, though he can swat a mosquito there. He can perform concrete, habitual movements and not abstract ones on command. Neither a mechanical nor an intellectual account explains this. What is damaged is a bodily way of having a world: the capacity to project a situation that is not actually given.
The blind man's stick. For someone practised with a cane, the stick is no longer an object he perceives. Its tip has become a zone of sensitivity; he feels the pavement at its end. Likewise a driver feels whether the car will pass through a gap, and an organist sits down at an unfamiliar instrument and after an hour plays it. Habit is knowledge in the hands. The body takes instruments into itself and extends its hold on the world.
The phantom limb. A man who has lost an arm may continue to feel it. Physiology alone does not explain this, since emotion and circumstance affect it; psychology alone does not, since cutting certain nerves abolishes it. Merleau-Ponty reads it as a refusal by the body to give up its familiar world of actions: the objects that used to be handled still appeal to a hand that is no longer there. The body is neither a thing nor an idea.
Cézanne. In his essays on painting, Cézanne is the artist who tried to paint the world as it takes shape in perception, before science and habit have sorted it: the apple emerging from colour, the mountain from the act of looking. The painter lends his body to the world. The late idea of flesh generalises this: the hand that touches can be touched, the seer is visible, and perceiver and world are of one fabric.
Works
- The Structure of Behavior, 1942
- Phenomenology of Perception, 1945
- Humanism and Terror, 1947
- The Visible and the Invisible, published posthumously, 1964
A common misreading
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the body is not materialism. The “lived body” he describes is the body as experienced and as the bearer of meaning, not the body described by physiology.
Influenced by
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, René Descartes
Influenced
Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze
Schools and eras
Phenomenology, Existentialism, Continental
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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