Transcendental idealism
Kant's doctrine that we know things only as they appear to us under the mind's own forms, never as they are in themselves.
Explanation
Immanuel Kant proposed a reversal he compared to that of Copernicus: instead of assuming that knowledge must conform to objects, suppose that objects, as we experience them, must conform to our ways of knowing. Space and time are the forms in which we receive sensations. Concepts such as cause and substance are rules by which the understanding organises what is received.
This explains how we can know some things about the world in advance of experience, such as that every event has a cause. The price is that such knowledge reaches only appearances. What things are in themselves, apart from our way of experiencing them, we cannot know. Kant insisted that appearances are empirically real and not illusions.
Critics
F.H. Jacobi objected that Kant needs the thing in itself to cause our sensations, yet his own theory forbids applying causality to it. G.W.F. Hegel rejected the unknowable thing in itself; Arthur Schopenhauer accepted the doctrine but identified the thing in itself with will.
G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche
Where scholars disagree
The central dispute is between “two-world” readings, on which appearances and things in themselves are different objects, and “two-aspect” readings, on which they are the same objects considered in different ways.
Originator
Related ideas
Analytic–synthetic distinction, Categorical imperative
Schools
Further reading
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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